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I. Introduction
In recent years there have been so many new developments
favoring tenants in Pennsylvania landlord and tenant law that many
landlords must feel that they are without remedy when a tenant
breaches a lease. The increase in tenant rights brought about by
Pugh v. Holmes' has been matched by limitation in the landlord's
traditional remedies of distraint, self-help and confession of judg-
ment. Despite these new limitations, however, the Pennsylvania land-
lord still retains substantial remedies for dealing with a defaulting
tenant. This article is intended as a survey of landlord remedies in
Pennsylvania, both in the areas of collection of overdue rent and re-
covery of possession of the demised premises. While written from the
perspective of the landlord, many areas of tenant rights are also
reviewed.
II. Preliminary Matters
A. Statute of Limitations
A four year statute of limitations period applies to all actions on
a contract, including a lease, which accrued after February 18, 1983.
This limitations period applies to written leases, oral leases and ac-
tions to collect rent for use and occupancy without an actual lease.2
The four year period begins to run from the time the cause of action
accrues.
3
If a lease term begins in 1953 and the landlord brings an action
in 1974 claiming that the tenant has not paid all of the monthly rent
due under the lease since 1953, is the entire action barred by the
statute of limitations or only the claim for those months prior to the
statutory period of limitations? These were essentially the facts and
the issue in Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co.4 in which the Commonwealth Court held that the only
claims barred by the statute of limitations were those that arose
more than six years before the filing of the complaint. The statute of
limitations for a lease at that time was six years. The court held that
1. 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897
(1979).
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5525(3), (4) and (7), as amended December 20, 1982
(Purdon 1984-85). Prior to the amendment, the statute of limitations for a written lease was
six years. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527(2) prior to amendment. Prior to June 27,
1978, the effective date of the Judicial Code, the statute of limitations for all leases, oral or
written, was six years. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 31, repealed April 28, 1978, effective June 27,
1978.
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5502(a) (Purdon 1984-85).
4. 31 Pa. Commw. 212, 375 A.2d 890 (1977), afid, 482 Pa. 615, 394 A.2d 491
(1978).
because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the cause
of action accrued, "[t]he Commission could have no cause of action
until each allegedly improperly computed payment was made and, as
to each such payment, a separate and distinct cause of action would
accrue."' As a result, summary judgment was appropriate "only as
to those causes of action predating the initiation of [the] action by
more than six years."' This approach is in accord with the law
outside the landlord-tenant area.7 If there is an acceleration clause in
the lease, the rule should still apply, at least until the landlord actu-
ally accelerates the rent' because use of an acceleration clause is at
the landlord's option.9
Under the same facts, an argument can be advanced that the
statute of limitations does not bar any part of the cause of action
because a lease is a continuing contract. The statute of limitations
does not run against a contractual cause of action, which is a contin-
uing one so long as the contractual relationship continues., Under
this theory, suits may be brought on a lease within four years of the
end of the term of the lease for rent due and owing during any previ-
ous portion of the lease term, no matter when the actual breach or
breaches occurred.
Most often the continuing contract rule has been applied to pro-
fessional service contracts. For example, in Thorpe v. Schoenbrun,"
an eye doctor sued a patient within six years (the statutory period of
limitations) from the date of that patient's last treatment. The physi-
cian was permitted to recover for all medical services rendered even
though some of the treatments had occurred more than six years
prior to the filing of the complaint."
The difference between a lease and a contract for professional
services is obvious: A lease usually provides for monthly payments
with specific payment dates and is, therefore, like an installment
contract, which is not considered a continuing contract.'8 In contrast,
professional services are usually provided at irregular times and pay-
5. 31 Pa. Commw. at 217, 375 A.2d at 892 (citations omitted).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Van Sciver v. Van Sciver, 337 Pa. 390, 12 A.2d 108 (1940) (applied to
husband's continuing duties under a separation agreement).
8. See Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Shapson & Schwartz, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 724
(1963). There is no controlling Pennsylvania decision and there is a split of authority on this
issue in other jurisdictions, at least as to an acceleration clause that appears to be self-execut-
ing by its language. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 133(1970).
9. Moretti v. Zanfino, 127 Pa. Super. 286, 193 A. 106 (1937). Acceleration clauses
are discussed infra notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
10. 2 STANDARD PA. PRACTICE 2D § 13:64 (1981).
11. 202 Pa. Super. 375, 195 A.2d 870 (1963).
12. See Rabben v. Steinberg, 187 Pa. Super. 28, 31, 142 A.2d 400, 401 (1958) and
cases cited therein which concern suits by attorneys.
13. Gruca v. U.S. Steel Corp., 360 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 495 F.2d 1252 (3rd Cir. 1974).
ment dates are rarely pre-determined. Therefore, the continuing con-
tract analysis should not be applicable to leases. The rule of Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 4 is
controlling and claims for rent accruing more than four years prior
to the filing of the complaint are barred.
B. Acceleration of Rent
1. Acceleration Clause in the Lease.-Many leases provide
that upon a tenant's default, "the entire rent for the balance of the
term of the lease shall immediately become due and payable as if by
the terms of this lease it were all payable in advance." This clause
and other similar provisions are denominated "rent acceleration
clauses." While there is a split of authority on the validity of these
clauses in the United States15 it is well-settled in Pennsylvania that
they are valid and enforceable according to their terms.1 " The Re-
statement (Second) of Property also takes the position that such
clauses are valid.
1 7
Rent acceleration clauses in Pennsylvania are deemed "in the
nature of penalties in favor of the lessor" 1 8 and are designed to dis-
courage the tenant's default.19 They are also viewed as "a guarantee
to the lessor that he will receive immediately all of the monies (or
other compensation) to which he is entitled under the lease without
having to harass a reluctant tenant as periodical payments become
due."20 Rent acceleration clauses do not automatically become oper-
ative on default and the landlord may or may not take advantage of
them.21 However, an alleged acceleration clause will not be enforced
unless it is sufficiently clear that the parties actually intended that
the rent would be accelerated upon default.22
2. No Acceleration Clause in the Lease.-When there is no
rent acceleration clause in the lease and the tenant abandons the
premises and stops paying rent, may the landlord sue the tenant for
14. 31 Pa. Commw. 212, 375 A.2d 890 (1977). See also Dairy Investments, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 67 Pa. Commw. 10, 445 A.2d 1340 (1982).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 Reporter's Notes para. 10
(1977).
16. Platt v. Johnson, 168 Pa. 47, 31 A. 935 (1895); American Seating Co. v. Murdock,
111 Pa. Super. 242, 169 A. 250 (1934); Brumbaugh v. Feldman, 47 Pa. Super. 10 (1911).
17. See § 12.1 comment k (1977).
18. Moretti v. Zanfino, 127 Pa. Super. 286, 290, 193 A. 106, 108 (1937).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 comment k
(1977).
20. Pierce v. Hoffstot, 211 Pa. Super. 380, 384, 236 A.2d 828, 830 (1967) (citations
omitted).
21. Id.; Moretti, 127 Pa. Super. 286, 193 A. 106 (1937).
22. See, e.g., Bob Collins, Inc. v. S. M. Hexter Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 683 (1977).
rent for the balance of the term or must he wait until the end of the
lease term and sue the tenant for all of the rent that is due in one
action? There are apparently no Pennsylvania cases dealing with a
landlord's right to accelerate rent in the absence of a lease provision
authorizing same, but the landlord could use the contractual theory
of anticipatory breach to sue in advance for all of the rent due. The
Restatement (Second) of Property does not address this issue, al-
though the comments to Section 12.1 indicate that such a theory of
recovery would not meet with approval.
In Pennsylvania, as a result of Pugh v. Holmes23 and its prog-
eny, leases are considered to be in the nature of contracts and are
therefore controlled by principles of contract law. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts sets forth the rule on anticipatory repudiation
as follows: "Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has com-
mitted a breach by non-performance and before he has received all
of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a
claim for damages for total breach." '24 The doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation of contract is well established in Pennsylvania. 5 Since
Pugh, it has been applied at least twice in landlord-tenant situations,
although not with regard to accelerated rent.2
Therefore no reason exists why the doctrine should not enable a
landlord to accelerate rent due from a tenant. Use of the doctrine
would accomplish the same purpose as a rent acceleration clause,
i.e., allowing the landlord to sue immediately for all rent due under
the lease without having to harass a reluctant tenant as periodic pay-
ments become due.27 Additionally, if at the time the tenant abandons
the demised premises there are more than four years remaining in
the term, the rules governing the statute of limitations would force
the landlord, absent a right to accelerate, to file two or more actions
to collect all of the rent due and owing.28
Of course, not every breach by the tenant should trigger the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. As the Supreme Court stated in
McClelland v. Amsterdam Casualty Co.,29 "In order to give rise to a
renunciation amounting to a breach of contract, there must be an
absolute and unequivocal refusal to perform or a distinct and positive
statement of an inability to do so." Mere failure to pay rent for a
23. 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), affd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979).
Pugh is discussed in further detail infra text accompanying notes 287-90.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1) (1981).
25. See, e.g., McClelland v. Amsterdam Casualty Co., 322 Pa. 429, 185 A. 198 (1938).
26. 2401 Pennsylvania Avenue Corp. v. Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Phil-
adelphia, - Pa. Super. -, 466 A.2d 132 (1983); Jonnet Dev. Corp. v. Dietrich Indus.,-
Pa. Super. -, 463 A.2d 1026 (1983).
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 2-14.
29. 322 Pa. 429, 433, 185 A. 198, 200 (1938).
few months would not meet this high standard of proof, but may
only show that the tenant was experiencing some financial difficul-
ties. Similarly, breach of a repair clause would not be the equivalent
of the tenant's unequivocal refusal to pay rent during the term of the
lease. However, abandonment of the demised premises without justi-
fication and without any present intention of returning coupled with
a failure to pay rent for several months3" is a clear repudiation of the
tenant's obligations under the lease and the landlord should then be
able to sue for the rent through the balance of the term.
Acceleration without a rent acceleration clause is contrary to
the weight of authority in the United States. One commentator has
noted, "The common-law rule that rent issues out of land at the end
of a period gives no support to an acceleration of rent. No action lies
for future rent in the absence of an acceleration clause."'" Addition-
ally, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has taken a position
against acceleration of payments in an analogous situation: the pay-
ment of installments due under a note.32 Additionally, commentators
have pointed out the greater severity of rent acceleration as con-
trasted with acceleration of payments due under a note. Acceleration
in a landlord-tenant relationship "results in the payment for some-
thing the tenant has not received, whereas the debtor in a promissory
note case is only being required to return sooner something he has
already received. 33
Nevertheless, in those situations where the tenant has aban-
doned the premises and has failed to pay rent for several months, the
arguments in favor of rent acceleration34 in the absence of a clause
authorizing it outweigh the arguments against it. This is particularly
true in a jurisdiction such as Pennsylvania which routinely enforces
rent acceleration clauses.
30. This is equivalent to the Restatement's definition of "abandonment". See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 comment i (1977).
31. 1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 2d, § 5.3 (1983) (footnotes omitted). But see the discussion
at § 16.302, which cites cases in which the landlord may immediately collect damages for an
anticipatory repudiation by the tenant, measured by the difference in the rent reserved in the
lease and the fair rental value of the premises for the balance of the term.
32. The Restatement provides:
Where at the time of the breach the only remaining duties of performance are
those of the party in breach and are for payment of money in installments not
related to one another, his breach by non-performance as to less than the whole,
whether or not accompanied by repudiation, does not give rise to a claim for
damages for total breach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243(3) (1981). But see Russell v. Barnes Found.,
52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1943), affd, 143 F.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
771 (1944) (employer breached an employment contract and the trial court
held that the employee was not limited to salary bonuses through
the time of trial but could seek his salary through the entire
term of the contract).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 comment k (1977).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 28.
Acceleration without a rent acceleration clause is not the pre-
sent law of Pennsylvania. The careful Pennsylvania landlord will,
therefore, insert a rent acceleration clause into his lease. Even if the
law of Pennsylvania changes, the landlord should still insert such a
clause in his lease. The clause would facilitate acceleration of rent
for breaches of the lease which might not meet the evidentiary re-
quirements of an anticipatory repudiation.
3. Accelerated Rent Versus Possession of the Premises.-A
suit for accelerated rent often is accompanied or followed by a suit
for eviction of the tenant. A suit for accelerated rent and an eviction
action are somewhat contradictory in nature since the landlord seeks
rent through the end of the term but simultaneously attempts to
evict the tenant before the end of the term. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property has developed certain rules to deal with these
anomalous situations:
1) if the acceleration clause is enforced and the landlord
actually collects the accelerated rent, the landlord cannot at the
same time terminate the lease and evict the tenant, (unless the
termination is a result of a different default by the tenant at
which time the landlord must reimburse the tenant for the rent
he has paid in advance, less any damages the landlord is entitled
to collect from the tenant for such default;
2) if the landlord does terminate the lease and evict the
tenant before the acceleration clause is enforced, the landlord
may not recover rent for the period after the eviction;
3) if the acceleration clause is enforced, the landlord actu-
ally collects the accelerated rent, and the landlord receives pos-
session of the demised premises without the resort to legal pro-
cess, such as by an abandonment of the demised premises, the
landlord may keep the accelerated rent but must account to the
tenant for any rent received from a new tenant;
4) if the tenant voluntarily abandons the demised premises,
the landlord may thereafter sue and collect accelerated rent but
must account to the tenant for any rent received from a new
tenant.3
5
The four rules may be summarized as follows:
1) If landlord accelerates the rent, he cannot terminate the
lease;
2) if landlord terminates the lease, he cannot accelerate the
rent;
3) if landlord accelerates the rent and tenant abandons the de-
mised premises, landlord may keep the rent unless there is an unjust
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 12.1 comment k (1977).
enrichment;
4) if tenant abandons the demised premises, landlord may accel-
erate the rent unless there is an unjust enrichment.
Pennsylvania law is substantially in accordance with the Restate-
ment rules."6
Rules 3 and 4 are somewhat inconsistent with Rule 2. If the
tenant voluntarily abandons the premises, he can be held liable for
the rent through the balance of the term. However, if the tenant
refuses to leave voluntarily and the landlord must resort to legal pro-
cess to evict the tenant, the tenant is not liable for the rent that
accrues after his eviction.3 7 These rules encourage the tenant to re-
fuse to voluntarily vacate the premises, forcing the landlord to resort
to the courts for a remedy. That is hardly a proper goal of rules of
law and procedure. Furthermore, until such time as the landlord is
able to re-rent the premises, his loss is as great whether the tenant
voluntarily leaves the premises or is forceably evicted.
The reason for the different result in these contrasting factual
circumstances was enunciated by the court in Greco v. Woodlawn
Furniture Co.38 In that case, the landlord desired to collect rent for
the period after he evicted the tenant by legal process. The court
conceded that if the tenant had abandoned the premises a month or
two earlier, the landlord could have resumed possession in the inter-
est of the tenant for the protection of the property. The landlord
then could have collected accelerated rent, less any rent received
from any new tenant for the property. By forcibly evicting the ten-
ant, the landlord lost that right. The court noted the distinction "be-
36. Rule 1 is supported by Pierce v. Hoffstat, 211 Pa. Super. 380, 236 A.2d 828,
(1967) in which the court said:
In the case of Mastovich v. Gradich, 123 Pa. Super. 355, 187 A. 65 (1936), this
court held that in such cases the landlord can accelerate for future rent accruing
under the lease or eject the tenant, but not both. The tenant, then, does not
forfeit all of his rights when the landlord accelerates, but must thereafter be
accorded his possessory rights upon payment of the accelerated rent.
Id. at 384, 236 A.2d at 830 (emphasis in original).
Support for Rule 2, above, is found in the Superior Court decision of Mack v. Fennel, 195 Pa.
Super. 501, 504, 171 A.2d 844, 845 (1961). There the court commented:
It is true that after the entry of a judgment in ejectment a landlord cannot any
longer collect rent because he is then dealing with the occupant of his premises
as a trespasser, and not as a tenant. He can eject the tenant and at the same
time enter judgment for the rent accrued when the tenant was evicted, but he
cannot recover both the possession and the rent for the balance of the term.
Id. at 504, 171 A.2d at 845 (emphasis in original).
Rules 3 and 4 above are supported by numerous Pennsylvania cases, which cases are discussed
in the section of this Article dealing with mitigation of damages. See infra notes 46-71 and
accompanying text.
37. This rule applies even where the tenant voluntarily moves out after the landlord has
obtained a judgment for possession. Actual expulsion from the premises by the sheriff is not
necessary to cause a termination of the lease. See Pusey v. Sipes, 56 Pa. Super. 121, 130
(1914).
38. 99 Pa. Super. 290 (1930).
tween possession of vacated premises taken by the landlord merely to
protect the property or minimize the damages that would follow the
tenant's abandonment, and a possession which would be adverse to
any resumption of occupation by the tenant and thus amount to an
eviction." 39
The rationale appears to be that when there is a forceable evic-
tion, the tenant may no longer regain possession of the premises by
payment of the accelerated rent and therefore he should not have to
pay rent for that period. However, when the tenant voluntarily sur-
renders the premises and that surrender is not accepted by the land-
lord, any action taken by the landlord is presumptively taken on be-
half of the tenant who may resume possession at any time prior to
re-renting by paying the accelerated rent.
This rule also may be viewed as an amelioration of the harsh
position of the Pennsylvania courts that a landlord has no duty to
mitigate his damages after a breach by the tenant.40 It would seem
unfair to allow the landlord to forcibly evict the tenant, make no
efforts to minimize his losses and then hold the tenant liable for the
rent through the end of the term. Therefore, with the probable rever-
sal of the Pennsylvania position on mitigation of damages, which is
unfair to tenants and should be reversed, a corresponding reversal of
the rule on eviction of tenants, which is unfair to landlords should
occur.
4 1
Some of the Pennsylvania cases addressing the issue of posses-
sion versus accelerated rent state the rules in terms of the entry of
judgment for possession and for accelerated rent rather than in
terms of the actual recovery of possession or actual collection of the
accelerated rent. For example, in Mastovich v. Gradich42 the court
stated that the landlord "can confess a judgment for future rent ac-
cruing under the acceleration clause, or a judgment in ejectment, but
not both."'43 To the extent these cases turn on the date of the entry
of the respective judgments rather than the actual recovery of pos-
session or rent, they are wrongly decided. The landlord may confess
judgment for a large amount of accelerated rent but never actually
receive one penny of that rent. The tenant obviously should not be
39. Id. at 292-93 (quoting Hochman v. Kuebler, 53 Pa. Super. 481, 487 (1913)).
40. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
41. See 2 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 2D § 16.302 (1983), which cites cases that provide that
where there is a survival of remedies clause in a lease, the landlord retains a claim for dam-
ages against the tenant after the lease has been terminated. See also Mack v. Fennell, 195 Pa.
Super. 501, 171 A.2d 844 (1968) which recognizes a claim for detention damages after the
termination of the lease.
42. 123 Pa. Super. 355, 187 A. 65 (1936).
43. Id. at 363, 187 A. at 69. See also DeLong Hook & Eye Co. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery
Co., 108 Pa. Super. 369, 164 A. 848 (1933); Grakelow v. Kidder, 95 Pa. Super. 250 (1929).
For a particularly incorrect application of this rule, see Huestis v. Cohen, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d
375 (1964).
allowed to remain on the premises through the end of the term with-
out paying rent just because a judgment for accelerated rent has
been entered. The converse is also true.
Some Pennsylvania cases have recognized the accuracy of this
position. In Sipes v. Pusey," the court noted that where the
defendant fights eviction after the judgment for possession is entered
against him, he remains liable for the rent during the period that he
actually retains possession of the demised premises after the entry of
the judgment.4
In any event, the procedural aspects of these principles have
been amended by the Rules of Civil Procedure, at least where the
judgments are obtained by confession. Rules 2953(b) and 2972,
adopted in 1969, provide that if an instrument, such as a lease, au-
thorizes judgment by confession in ejectment and for money, entry
of one shall not preclude entry of the other. Indeed, it is likely that if
the confession process is used, judgments for money and possession
will both be obtained in one pleading. The notes to these rules make
it clear, however, that the extent to which the plaintiff may have
satisfaction under one or both of these judgments is a matter of sub-
stantive law to be determined in accordance with the principles pre-
viously set forth in this article.
C. Mitigation of damages
1. The Historic Rule in Pennsylvania.-Most Pennsylvania
lawyers who are not familiar with landlord-tenant law are astonished
to discover that Pennsylvania historically has taken the position that
a landlord has no duty to mitigate damages when a tenant abandons
a lease. The landlord may stand by and do nothing and still recover
from the original tenant the entire rent through the end of the term.
As the Supreme Court said in Auer v. Penn,46 "The landlord may
allow the property to stand idle, and hold the tenant for the entire
rent . . . . ,
The Pennsylvania rule is in accord with the majority view in the
United States.48 Additionally, and in what may only be described as
an astonishing development, the Restatement (Second) of Property
also takes the position that a landlord has no duty to mitigate his
44. 49 Pa. Super. 326 (1912).
45. See also Chelton Avenue Building Corp. v. Mayer, 316 Pa. 228, 172 A. 675
(1934); Pusey v. Sipes, 56 Pa. Super. 121 (1914).
46. 99 Pa. 370 (1882)
47. Id. at 375-76. See also Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640 (1928); General
Tire & Rubber Co. v. General Tire & Sales Co., 93 Pa. Super. 173, 175 (1927).
48. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3D 534, 541 (1968), which sets forth the majority position as
of 1968. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 Reporter's Notes comment 8
(1977).
damages. Section 12.1(3) provides, in pertinent part:
Except to the extent the parties to the lease validly agree other-
wise, if the tenant abandons the leased property, the landlord is
under no duty to attempt to relet the leased property for the
balance of the term of the lease to mitigate the tenant's liability
under the lease, including his liability for rent . . . .
The Pennsylvania courts have not enunciated the reasons for
their position. Other courts have premised the rule upon the theory
that the tenant, by leasing, has purchased a vested estate in land or
that the tenant should not be allowed to impose a duty on the land-
lord through his own wrongdoing.5" The Restatement (Second) of
Property states that "abandonment of property is an invitation to
vandalism and the law should not encourage such conduct by putting
a duty of mitigation of damages on the landlord."51 A close exami-
nation of these reasons, however, does not justify retention of this
rule, especially considering the contractual nature of the modern
landlord-tenant relationship.
Of course, no rule of law prevents the landlord from taking
steps to re-rent the premises, thus reducing his damages. In fact, one
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, while recognizing the general
rule, suggests that "a landlord should be reasonably diligent in se-
curing a desirable tenant for the best rent obtainable to minimize the
lessee's losses."'5 2 If the landlord does in fact re-rent, any rent actu-
ally received from the new tenant must be credited to the account of
the defaulting tenant. 8
2. Probable Reversal of the Historic Rule.-As noted above,
Pugh v. Holmes and its progeny" make it clear that leases are now
to be treated as contracts in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the rule
that a non-breaching party in a contract situation must take reasona-
ble steps to mitigate his damages is well-established in Pennsylva-
nia.5 As the Supreme Court said in Henry Shenk Co. v. Erie
49. Id. § 12.1(3).
50. 21 A.L.R.3D at 539.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 comment i (1977).
52. Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. at 95, 141 A. at 643 (citations omitted). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1(3)(b) (1977).
53. Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370 (1882); Fitzpatrick v. Rogers, 75 Pa. Super. 273 (1920);
Kohn v. Blumenfield, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 292 (1973). In Wilson Laundry Co. v. Joos, 200 Pa.
Super. 595, 189 A.2d 917 (1963), the landlord relet the premises to a new tenant at twice the
original rent. The court held that since the increased rent was caused by expensive repairs
made by the landlord to the premises, the defaulting tenant should not receive a credit for the
increased rent.
54. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Gaylord Builders v. Richmond Metal Mfg. Corp., 186 Pa. Super. 101,
140 A.2d 358 (1958).
County," "The rule that a party cannot recover damages from a
defaulting defendant which could have been avoided by the exercise
of reasonable care and effort is applicable to all types of
contracts.1
5 7
The cases which espouse the rule that the landlord has no duty
to mitigate damages are older cases and no appellate decisions since
Pugh have supported that position. It is therefore likely that the next
time the issue reaches the appellate courts, the older rule will be
overturned and the landlord will be deemed to have a duty to miti-
gate his damages. Even before that decision is rendered, the prudent
Pennsylvania landlord will begin to take reasonable steps to mitigate
damages upon the tenant's default.
3. What Constitutes Mitigation.-Because of the state of the
law in Pennsylvania, few decisions actually explore the type and ex-
tent of conduct which will satisfy a duty to mitigate damages. How-
ever, some Pennsylvania cases, along with decisions from other
states, indicate the likely trend in Pennsylvania law once the historic
rule is overturned. For example, there is a split of authority in the
United States on the question of burden of proof. The courts are
about equally divided between those requiring that the landlord
prove his exercise of due diligence and those requiring that the ten-
ant prove a lack of due diligence on the part of the landlord. 8 In
Pennsylvania, in the typical breach-of-contract action, it is well-set-
tled that "the party who has breached the contract or caused the loss
has the burden of showing that the losses could have been avoided
through the reasonable efforts of the damaged party." ' Therefore,
once the rule is changed in Pennsylvania the tenant will bear the
burden of showing the landlord's failure to mitigate damages.
Although the actual language in court opinions may vary, there
is substantial agreement in the United States that the standard to be
used in evaluating the landlord's conduct is similar to the "reasona-
ble man" standard of the law of negligence.60 Pennsylvania cases,
both in and out of the landlord-tenant area, also use the test of "rea-
sonableness" in determining whether a non-breaching party has
taken proper steps to mitigate his damages.'1 Perhaps the best
56. 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662 (1935).
57. Id. at 109, 178 A. at 666 (emphasis added).
58. 21 A.L.R.3D at 542.
59. State Pub. School Bldg. Auth. v. W. M. Anderson Co., 49 Pa. Commw. 420, 423,
410 A.2d 1329, 1331 (1980). Accord Williams v. National Org., Masters, Mates & Pilots of
America, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896 (1956). For landlord-tenant cases, see Zanfino v. Mo-
retti, 86 P.L.J. 605 (1938); Hoffman Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 32, 35 (1969).
60. 21 A.L.R.3D at 542.
61. Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 95, 141 A. 640, 643 (1928); Runner v. National In-
dustrial Builders, Inc., 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 65, 70 (1970); State Public School Bldg., 49 Pa.
description of the standard to be used is a "reasonable commercial
standard." 2
The Restatement (Second) of Property has commented that the
"reasonableness" of the landlord's attempts at mitigation "will de-
pend on many factors, such as the remaining length of the original
term, the time of the year the vacancy occurs, and the cost of pre-
paring the property for a new tenant."63 Typical methods of attempt-
ing to mitigate damages include newspaper advertising, posting signs
on the premises, employing a realtor and showing the premises to
prospective tenants.64 To the extent the landlord makes reasonable
but unsuccessful efforts to mitigate, his claim should not be reduced
based upon a failure to actually relet the premises.65
The Restatement fails to mention the most important factor in
evaluating the landlord's results: the market conditions existing dur-
ing the period in which the landlord is attempting to relet the prem-
ises. The landlord's decision to relet the premises at a lower or
higher rate than it was rented to the defaulting tenant, to give free
rent to the new tenant for a short period, to re-rent for a shorter or
longer lease term or to alter the demised premises must be evaluated
for commercial reasonableness given the market conditions then
existing.6
The few Pennsylvania cases on landlord's mitigation are some-
what contradictory. These cases arose when the landlord actually at-
tempted to re-rent the premises after a tenant's abandonment even
though under no duty to do so. In Brill v. Haifitz,67 the premises
were relet in one lease along with four other properties after a parti-
tion between two stores was removed and certain minor repairs were
completed. The new tenant's rent was less than that of the original
tenant. The court held that the landlord had mitigated his damages.
Similarly, in Wilson Laundry,6 8 the landlord's extensive repairs
before re-renting were also approved by the court. On the other
hand, in Rafferty v. Klein,69 the landlord relet the premises for a
term extending far beyond the expiration of the original term, at a
lesser rate per month. The court held that the landlord could not
recover rent from the original tenant after the beginning of the new
Commw. at 423, 410 A.2d at 1331.
62. Cf Home-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 comment i (1977).
64. 21 A.L.R.3D at 542. See Brill v. Haifetz, 158 Pa. Super. 158, 163, 44 A.2d 311,
313 (1945).
65. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2) (1981).
66. For a discussion of some of the cases from other jurisdictions, see 2 FRIEDMAN ON
LEASES 2d § 16.303 (1983).
67. 158 Pa. Super. 158, 44 A.2d 311 (1945).
68. See supra note 53.
69. 256 Pa. 481, 100 A. 945 (1917).
term.
Tenants sometimes argue that in a multi-unit building, the
landlord must attempt to rent the defaulting tenant's unit before at-
tempting to rent other vacant units in order to sustain his obligation
to mitigate damages. This is patently absurd because it would reduce
the damages the landlord could collect from the tenant without a
corresponding reduction in the actual damages suffered as a result of
the tenant's breach.
70
Finally, even if the landlord breaches his duty to mitigate dam-
ages the tenant is not released from his obligation to pay all of the
rent due. The amount of loss that the landlord reasonably could have
avoided is simply subtracted from the amount of rent that otherwise
would have been recoverable as damages."
III. Actions For Collection of Rent
A. Suit Before District Justice
The simplest and most cost-efficient method for recovering over-
due rent is to file an action in assumpsit before a district justice. The
action is commenced by filing a complaint on a standard form pre-
scribed by the State Court Administrator. 72 An attorney is not re-
quired. A hearing on the complaint should be scheduled promptly 3
and the judgment of the district justice must be given at the conclu-
sion of the hearing or within five days thereafter.
7'
If the tenant does not voluntarily pay a money judgment for
rent, the landlord has two alternatives. First, he may request an or-
der of execution from the district justice which the constable or sher-
iff may use to levy on the tangible personal property of the tenant.75
In the alternative, the landlord may file the transcript of the judg-
ment of the district justice with the prothonotary's office and proceed
with more formal execution pursuant to the applicable Rules of Civil
70. In rejecting such an argument, the court in Hoffman Estate said:
This would necessarily result in the landlord's sustaining a further loss in addi-
tion to that which it might have sustained if it could not recover from the lessee.
We state this because the initial problem was created by the lessee in breaching
the lease by abandoning the premises. As a matter of law or equity, we refuse to
accept the argument advanced by lessee's counsel.
47 Pa. D. & C.2d 32, 35-36 (1969).
Compare Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., stating, "Reasonableness is to be determined by an
examination of the totality of the circumstances giving due regard to the efforts of the landlord
in renting the abandoned premises, and the number of units he has for rent." 22 Ariz. App.
445, 450, 528 P.2d 637, 641 (1974) (emphasis added).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 350 (1981). Gale Indus. Inc. v. Bristol
Farmers Market & Auction Co., 431 Pa. 464, 477, 246 A.2d 391, 397 (1968).





There are several important drawbacks to bringing an action in
assumpsit before a district justice to collect rent due. First, the juris-
dictional limit of the district justice is $4,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.7 While this limit should not present an obstacle to most
residential landlords even if they are seeking accelerated rent, it will
present an absolute bar to many commercial landlords.
If a landlord's claim for rent is slightly over $4,000, he may
waive that portion of his claim in excess of the jurisdictional limit. In
that event, three possibilities could occur. If the landlord prevails in
the amount of $4,000 and the tenant does not appeal, the landlord's
waiver is binding and in no event may he recover an amount in ex-
cess of $4,000 on that claim. 7 8 However, if the landlord prevails
before the district justice and the defendant appeals, the landlord's
waiver is automatically revoked and he may recover additional rent
on appeal.79 Finally, the landlord could prevail before the district
justice but in an amount less than $4,000. If the landlord decides to
appeal, he should be permitted to seek an amount in excess of
$4,000, since the appeal is heard de novo in the Court of Common
Pleas.80
The major drawback in filing an assumpsit action before a dis-
trict justice is that the tenant has an unfettered right to appeal the
decision to the Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo.8 1 The
tenant does not have to post a bond and the appeal operates as an
automatic supersedeas of any money judgment rendered by the dis-
trict justice.8 2 The tenant has thirty days in which to file his appeal;
therefore, no execution may issue on a money judgment of a district
justice until at least thirty days has passed from the date of the
judgment.8
B. Action for Breach of Contract
The most common method of collecting overdue rent is the filing
of a civil action in the Court of Common Pleas for breach of con-
76. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1516 (Purdon 1984-85).
77. Id. § 1515(a)(3), as amended 1982, Dec. 13, P.L. 1141, No. 260, §1, effective Jan.
1, 1983.
78. See id., as amended on December 20, 1982, which provides that an appeal by the
defendant automatically revokes the plaintiff's waiver. Prior to amendment, an appeal by ei-
ther party could revoke the waiver. In any event, if the landlord would receive a $4,000. judg-
ment, he would have little reason to appeal.
79. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1515(a)(3) (Purdon 1984-85).
80. See PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 1007. The Note to the Rule provides that on appeal, "all
parties will be free to treat the case as though it had never been before the district
justice ....
81. Id. 1002, 1007.
82. Id. 1003, 1008(A).
83. Id. 402.
tract. Such a cause of action specifically is authorized by the Land-
lord and Tenant Act of 1951.84 Additionally, when the landlord
seeks the value of use and occupancy of the premises by a tenant in
possession without a lease, an action for breach of contract in the
nature of a claim for restitution is appropriate.85
Additionally, a civil action at law for an accounting may be ap-
propriate when the landlord seeks to collect percentage rent based on
the tenant's sales from the demised premises.86 Such an action is
authorized by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021 when the
accounting sought is incident to a claim for breach of contract.8" In-
deed, unless the accounting sought is complicated and difficult, eq-
uity does not even have jurisdiction of the action and a party's only
remedy is at law. 88 Therefore, in most landlord-tenant situations any
accounting that is sought should be brought at law.
C. Confession of Judgment for Money
When a lease contains language authorizing confession of judg-
ment against the tenant for monies due, the landlord may move
swiftly and inexpensively to obtain a monetary judgment against the
tenant.89 Almost simultaneously, the landlord may file for a writ of
execution and direct the sheriff to execute on the judgment. 9
The tenant may delay the proceedings by filing a petition to
open the judgment, a petition to strike the judgment or a single peti-
tion alleging both grounds for relief.91 Upon review, the court may
issue a rule on the landlord to show cause why the judgment should
not be stricken and/or opened.
At the time the petition is presented, the tenant usually requests
and receives a stay of the proceedings, including execution on any
judgment.92 If the landlord has praeciped for a writ of execution
prior to filing of the tenant's petition, however, the court should not,
except in thei rarest of circumstances, stay execution unless the te-
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.301 (Purdon 1984-85). The statute uses the older
term "assumpsit."
85. Flomar Corp. v. Logue, 418 Pa. 181, 210 A.2d 254 (1965).
86. Maher v. Richlin Stores, Inc., 85 Pa. D. & C. 67 (1953); Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 31 Pa. Commw. 212, 375 A.2d 890 (1977), affd, 482 Pa.
615, 394 A.2d 491 (1978).
87. Hudak v. Walter G. O'Connor Co., I Pa. D. & C.3d 317 (1975); 2 GOODRICH-
AMRAM 2D § 1021:3 (1976).
88. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Keystone Ins. Agency, Inc., 420 Pa. 578, 218 A.2d 294
(1966).
89. For a review of the case law as to what language actually authorizes a confession
of judgment, see Pittsburgh Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 69, 191 A.2d 872
(1963).
90. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text for the procedures that may be
used.
91. PA. R. Civ. P. 2959(a).
92. Id. 2959(b).
nant files a bond.93 It is therefore to the landlord's advantage to
praecipe for the writ of execution as soon as possible after filing of
the judgment."
1. Praecipe v. Complaint Procedure.-There are two methods
for obtaining a confession of judgment in Pennsylvania. The simplest
and least expensive method is to file the original instrument author-
izing the confession with the prothonotary, usually accompanied by a
praecipe directing entry of judgment for the face amount of the in-
strument. 95 No complaint is filed. The second method is to file a
complaint setting forth the averments contained in Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 2952 accompanied by a copy of the instru-
ment.96 A verification must also be included with the complaint.9
7
As a practical matter, a landlord will be required to use
the complaint procedure almost all of the time. The praecipe proce-
dure may be used only when the amount due appears from the face
of the instrument. "As a corollary to this oft-stated rule, it is also the
law that where the amount due is not apparent from the face of the
instrument but may be calculated from information which the in-
strument itself furnishes, then too can the Prothonotary assess dam-
ages and enter judgment."" Thus, when the lease authorizes a judg-
ment for rent for the entire lease term prior to default, the praecipe
procedure may be used. Such a confession clause would be very un-
usual. However, if judgment for accelerated rent is desired after the
term has commenced, a praecipe could not be used since the number
of months for which rent is sought is not apparent from the face of
the instrument.
Lenson v. Klovsky" illustrates another situation. In that case,
the lease authorized confession of judgment for accelerated rent less
the fair rental value of the premises through the end of the term.
The court struck the judgment filed by praecipe, holding that be-
cause the fair rental value of the premises was an indeterminate
amount, the landlord had to proceed by complaint and not by prae-
cipe. In addition, it is obvious that when a lease requires default
before a judgment by confession may be entered, the complaint pro-
cedure is the only procedure that may be used to obtain the
93. Id. 3121(a)(2).
94. For a more complete discussion of the Pennsylvania law of confession of judgment,
see SPRENKLE, Pennsylvania Confession of Judgment (1982) and 8 GOOD-RdCH AMRAM 2D.
§§ 2953, 2972 (1976). Confession of judgment clauses are sometimes referred to as warrants
of attorney or cognovit provisions.
95. PA. R. Civ. P. 2951(a).
96. PA. R. Civ. P. 2952(b). Note that the original instrument need not be filed.
97. Id. 2952(i).
98. Lenson v. Klovsky, 430 Pa. 193, 197, 241 A.2d 66, 68 (1968).
99. id.
judgment."'
The complaint procedure gives the landlord great latitude in ob-
taining judgment against the tenant. It is now well-settled that when
the complaint filed is supported by an averment of default and an
assessment of damages for the amount due, the confession may be
based on matters outside the lease.10' The judgment entered in this
manner is presumptively valid and if the tenant disputes the default
alleged or the amount of damages claimed, he must petition the
courts "to open the judgment so that evidence might be presented to
mitigate the alleged assessment of damages."102 If, in his petition
and evidence in support of the petition, the tenant raises issues which
would be submitted to the jury in a jury trial, the court will open the
judgment and hold a trial on the merits. 10 3 If no factual issues are
presented, the judgment will stand. During all of these proceedings,
the lien of judgment or of any levy or attachment is preserved.
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The scope of the complaint procedure is limited only by the lan-
guage of the confession of judgment clause. In Kros v. Bacall Tex-
tile Corp.,10 5 for example, the lease provided that all sums which
might become due as a result of the tenant's failure to comply with
the lease terms were payable as rent. Another provision required
that the tenant use every reasonable precaution against fire at the
premises. When a fire occurred, the landlord confessed judgment
against the tenant for the resulting damages averring that the tenant
failed to take reasonable precautions against fire. The court refused
to strike the judgment, holding that since fire damages were to be
paid as rent they were within the scope of the confession of judg-
ment. After reviewing other cases, the court said:
The point of all these and similar cases is that an obligor may
confess judgment against himself in any way or according to any
terms or conditions he may see fit to do, and, that, being so, may
authorize any attorney to do so for him in an amicable proceed-
ing [the complaint procedure] and without any recourse
whatever to the Act of 1806 [the praecipe procedure].'0°
Courts carefully scrutinize the terms of the lease to determine if
100. Medvidovich v. Sterner, 50 Pa. D. & C. 690 (1944).
101. Evans v. Blimpie Base, Inc., 284 Pa. Super. 256, 425 A.2d 801 (1981) (overruling
Edward Berstad Co. v. Babe's Bar, Inc., 254 Pa. Super. 477, 386 A.2d 50 (1978)).
102. Lenson, 430 Pa. at 201, 241 A.2d at 70 (emphasis in original). See also Van Arkel
and Moss Properties v. Kendor, Ltd., 276 Pa. Super. 547, 419 A.2d 593 (1982).
103. PA. R. Civ. P. 2959(e).
104. Id. 2959(0.
105. 386 Pa. 360, 126 A.2d 421 (1956).
106. Id. at 366, 126 A.2d at 424. Of course, the tenant could have filed a petition to
open judgment, alleging that he did not cause the fire and the case would probably have pro-
ceeded to a trial on the merits.
the items claimed are within the scope of the confession of judgment
clause. For example, if the lease authorizes confession for the land-
lord's cost of repairing the demised premises, judgment may be en-
tered for the actual repair costs." 7 However, if the landlord has not
actually repaired the premises he may not confess for the estimated
cost of repairs. 108 It is important that the landlord carefully scruti-
nize his lease before filing a complaint in confession of judgment,
because if a judgment is entered for an item not authorized by the
lease the entire judgment will be stricken.'0 9
2. The Tenant's Understanding of the Confession
Clause.-Pennsylvania requires a clearer manifestation of consent to
sustain a confession of judgment clause than it does to sustain a nor-
mal lease provision." 0 This rule is based on both public policy and
constitutional considerations.
In Swarb v. Lennox,"' a three-judge federal court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania reviewed confession of judgment clauses
in leases and consumer financing transactions. The court noted that
waiver of a person's right to a hearing before judgment is constitu-
tional only so long as it is intelligent and voluntarily made. The court
then held that consumers who earned less than $10,000 are pre-
sumed not to have effected an intelligent and voluntary waiver. The
court therefore issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of
confessed judgments against persons with annual incomes of less
than $10,000.
It is well-settled that Swarb v. Lennox is not binding outside of
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and consumers living elsewhere
with annual incomes of less than $10,000.00 are not presumed to
lack an understanding of the confession of judgment clause."" While
the decision may not be binding, the Superior Court has stated that
Swarb v. Lennox is "[nionetheless a thoughtful and well-considered
decision . . . . [Ilt expresses the proper standard by which to mea-
sure the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania procedure i.e., if the
waiver of procedural rights entailed in signing a confession note is to
be valid, it must be intelligent and voluntary. '""
In another case considering confessions of judgment from a
107. Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956).
108. Gratz Bros. v. Margolis, 186 Pa. Super. 268, 142 A.2d 375 (1958). Accord
Langman v. Metropolitan Acceptance Corp., - Pa. Super. -, 465 A.2d 5 (1983).
109. Id.
110. Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc. v. Polony, 222 Pa. Super. 315, 322, 294 A.2d
799, 804 (1972).
111. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), af'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
112. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Plavi, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 161 (1980).
113. North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Shultz, 250 Pa. Super. 530, 534, 378 A.2d
1275, 1277 (1977).
public policy perspective, the Superior Court reached the same con-
clusion. The court said, "In Pennsylvania, because of the severity of
the consequences attached to a warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment, the courts have required that as a matter of public policy the
consent of the party authorizing confession be clearly given."1" " The
tenants, Hungarian immigrants who spoke only broken English, were
dissuaded from procuring outside assistance by the landlord, who
convinced them to use his attorney instead. The lease obviously was
drawn from the landlord's point of view: the confession of judgment
clause was contained in two sentences, the first of which was 182
words long, and it appeared on the third page of a 7,000 word lease
in the same size type as most of the rest of the document. The land-
lord's attorney did not mention the confession of judgment clause to
the tenants. Under these circumstances, the court held that the facts
did not "suggest the clear consent necessary to sustain a confession
of judgment clause."11'
Provio Leasing Corp. v. Safin,"6 which involved an equipment
lease, is a good example of a case in which the clear consent of the
lessee was shown. Safin asserted that he did not understand the con-
fession of judgment clause, that he had no counsel present at the
time of signing and that the provisions of the lease were not ex-
plained to him. The court pointed out, however, that the lessee did
not show why he could not have understood the documents or that he
ever asked for an explanation of any of the provisions of the agree-
ment. The lease was commercial in nature and the lessee had been in
business for thirteen or fourteen years during which time he had pre-
sumably gained some business acumen. Moreover, the confession of
judgment clause was clear and conspicuous. The clause was con-
tained in the first paragraph of a Lease Guarantee which had to be
executed along with the lease. The paragraph containing the clause
was captioned "CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT" in bold face
capitals and was the only paragraph captioned. Immediately follow-
ing the paragraph was a bold face, capitalized warning." 7 The court
114. Egyptian Sands, 222 Pa. Super. at 319-20, 294 A.2d at 803. Egyptian Sands is a
good example of a case in which the court opened a judgment because the clear consent of the
tenant to the confession of judgment clause could not be shown.
115. Id. at 323, 294 A.2d at 804. See also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Abbot, 6 Pa.
D. & C.3d 299 (1977); Kings Valley, Inc. v. Feeser, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 93 (1975).
116. 265 Pa. Super. 423, 402 A.2d 510 (1979).
117. The warning appeared as follows:
"THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND
THE CONFESSION CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT HEREOF,
THAT THIS TRANSACTION IS COMMERCIAL IN NATURE AND
THAT THEY WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A HEARING WHICH WOULD
OTHERWISE BE A CONDITION TO LESSOR'S OBTAINING THE
JUDGMENTS AUTHORIZED BY PARAGRAPH EIGHT HEREOF."
Id. at 428, 402 A.2d at 513.
concluded that the warning was "clear, understandable and
obvious." 118
In reviewing these two cases and other cases on knowing and
voluntary waivers in signing confession of judgment clauses, it is
hard to reconcile the positions taken by the courts. Provio Leasing,
however, provides some guidance for drafting a lease containing a
confession of judgment. It is to the landlord's advantage to put the
confession of judgment clause in a separate rider signed by the ten-
ant at the time the main lease is signed. This is particularly so where
the main lease is lengthy and the confession clause would become
buried among the other provisions. The rider should be clearly la-
belled "Confession of Judgment" and contain a boldface warning
similar to that in Provio Leasing. If this drafting suggestion is fol-
lowed, the landlord will have an advantage over the tenant who ar-
gues that he did not understand the confession of judgment clause.119
3. Assignment and Subletting.-A judgment may be con-
fessed in favor of the landlord, assignee or other transferee of the
landlord's interest.2 0 The facts supporting the assignment or trans-
fer, however, must be set forth in the complaint or the judgment will
be stricken. 2" The praecipe procedure may not be used when there
has been an assignment of the landlord's interest.
The rule is different when there has been an assignment of the
tenant's interest. Unless the assignment itself contains a confession
of judgment clause, the confession contained in the original lease is
not binding on the tenant's assignee. 12 2 Nor is it binding upon a sub-
tenant under the lease.2 Similarly, a guarantor of a lease contain-
ing a confession of judgment clause will not be deemed to have au-
thorized a confession against himself unless the guaranty also
contains a confession of judgment clause.
12 4
118. 265 Pa. Super. at 428, 402 A.2d at 513. See also Plum Tree, Inc. v. Seligson, 224
Pa. Super. 471, 307 A.2d 298 (1973).
119. Compare Serfass v. Kreykenbohm, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 228 (1979) with Greiber v.
Kennedy, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 140 (1983). The Serfass case appears to be a too rigid reading of
the decision in Provio Leasing, particularly since the court struck the judgment instead of
merely opening it.
120. Starle v. Galiardi Coal and Coke Co., 168 Pa. Super. 254, 77 A.2d 669 (1951).
See also PA. R. Civ. P. 2954. This Rule of Civil Procedure overrules some prior conflicting
case law.
121. Fourtees Co. v. Sterling Equip. Corp., 242 Pa. Super. 199, 363 A.2d 1229 (1976);
Testa v. Lally, 161 Pa. Super. 478, 55 A.2d 552 (1947). See also PA. R. Civ. P. 2952(c).
122. Ahern v. Standard Realty Co., 267 Pa. 404, 110 A. 141 (1920), Ansley v. George
Coal Mining Co., 88 Pa. Super. 40 (1926). But see Bankers Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lincoln
Plan Corp., 42 Pa.D. & C.2d 241 (1966) (landlord may confess against a successor to a signa-
tory tenant since a successor corporation, in law, is the same company.)
123. Stewart v. Jackson, 181 Pa. 549, 37 A. 518 (1897). Kait v. Rose, 351 Pa. 560,
563, 41 A.2d 750, 752 (1945) (the difference between assignee or subtenant is immaterial on
this issue).
124. Solebury Nat'l Bank of New Hope v. Cairns, 252 Pa. Super. 45, 380 A.2d 1273
4. Holding Over and Lease Renewals.-The cases in this area
are confusing and somewhat inconsistent. However, some general
principles can be delineated.
When a tenant holds over after the initial term of the lease ex-
pires, but pursuant to a provision in the lease, the confession of judg-
ment clause can be used against the tenant for rent accruing during
the period of holding over. 25 This rule applies when, for example,
the lease provides that if the tenant lawfully remains on the premises
after the end of the term, the lease is converted into a month-to-
month tenancy.
When a tenant holds over at the end of the term, but not pursu-
ant to a provision in the lease, the tenant becomes a tenant at suffer-
ance. The landlord has the option to treat him as a trespasser or as a
tenant for an additional term. If the term is for less than one year,
he becomes a tenant for a like term; if the term is one year or more,
he becomes a tenant from year to year.
126
Until such time as the landlord treats the holdover tenant as a
trespasser, perhaps by entering a judgment in ejectment, the tenant
is considered to be holding over under the prior lease and therefore
the confession clause can be used against him. . Indeed, where the
landlord uses the confession clause against a holdover tenant it is
presumed that the landlord is treating the holding over as a continu-
ance of the original lease, making the confession remedy available to
the landlord
28
Where, however, there is not a holding over but rather a re-
newal of the lease on the same or different terms, there can be no
confession of judgment unless the renewal agreement itself contains
a confession of judgment clause. "Pennsylvania will not presume an
intent of parties to a modified contract to perpetuate a warrant of
attorney" contained in the original contract. 129 Thus, in Baederwood
Shopping Center v. St. George & Co.,' 30 when the lease was termi-
nated and a new agreement substituted, the confession was not pre-
sumed to carry over into the new agreement even though the new
(1977).
125. Gold v. Fox Film Corp., 289 Pa. 429 (1927); Thompson v. Cams, 93 Pa. Super.
575 (1928); Thomas v. Brady, 26 Erie 168 (1943); Jasuta v. Zaremba, 47 Lack. 157 (1946).
126. Routman v. Bohm, 194 Pa. Super. 413, 168 A.2d 612 (1961).
127. Mack v. Fennell, 195 Pa. Super. 501, 171 A.2d 844 (1961).
128. City of Pittsburgh v. Charles Zubik & Sons, Inc., 404 Pa. 219, 171 A.2d 776
(1961). Mack and Zubik would seem to overrule a prior line of cases which state that a
holding over after the end of the term, without a renewal clause in the lease, does not renew
the warrant of attorney. See the cases cited in SPRENKLE, PENNSYLVANIA CONFESSION OF
JUDGMENT § 4.11.3, notes 5 and 6 (1982).
129. Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc. v. Polony, 222 Pa. Super. at 321, 294 A.2d at
803 (citing Solazo v. Boyle, 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d 179 (1950)).
130. 103 Montg Co. L.R. 84 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 262 Pa. Super. 55, 396
A.2d 642 (1978).
agreement incorporated by reference certain terms of the original
lease.
Perhaps the best example of this rule is found in the case of
Scott v. 1953 Walnut Corp. 1' In that case, a 1950 lease agreement
containing a confession of judgment clause was renewed by four suc-
cessive renewal agreements, the last one signed in 1972 for a ten
year extension term commencing October 1, 1975. The 1972 amend-
ment did not contain a confession of judgment clause, and did not
incorporate by reference the 1950 lease. It did provide, however, that
the terms of the 1950 lease, as amended, remained in full force and
effect. Judgment was confessed in 1980 under the 1972 extension
agreement.
On appeal, the Superior Court held that the confession was in-
valid. It first noted that courts are not permitted to presume that "it
was the intent of the parties, in their various agreements up through
and including the 1972 agreement, to perpetuate" the 1950 confes-
sion of judgment clause."3 2 Additionally, the confession of judgment
clause in the 1950 lease could not be considered "as a binding part
of the 1972 agreement, as it was only in an appended document, and
thus bore no direct relation to the signature of the [tenant] on the
1972 document."' 33 The Scott court concluded "that the mere gen-
eral reference in the 1972 document to the July 1, 1950 lease is in-
sufficient to bind the [tenant] to the warrant of attorney clause set
forth in that lease.' ' 4
Two more comments on holding over and renewals are appropri-
ate. First, many short-form renewal agreements mention and incor-
porate the confession of judgment clause in the original lease without
actually setting forth a new confession of judgment clause in the re-
131. 301 Pa. Super. 248, 447 A.2d 951 (1982).
132. 301 Pa. Super. at 259, 447 A.2d at 956.
133. Id. In this regard, the court cited Frantz Tractor Company v. Wyoming Valley
Nursery, where the court said:
A general reference in the body of an executed lease to terms and conditions to
be found outside the agreement is insufficient to bind the lessee to a warrant of
attorney not contained in the body of the lease unless the lessee signs the war-
rant where it does appear. In short, a warrant of attorney to confess judgment is
not to be foisted upon anyone by implication or by general and nonspecific refer-
ence .... [A] warrant of attorney to confess judgment must be self-sustaining; to
be self-sustaining, the warrant must be in writing and signed by the person to be
bound by it; and the requisite signature must bear a direct relation to the war-
rant and may not be implied extrinsically nor imputed from the assignment of
the instrument containing the warrant.
384 Pa. 213, 216-18, 120 A.2d 303, 305-07 (1956).
134. 301 Pa. Super. at 259, 447 A.2d at 956-957. Tenreed Corp. v. Philadelphia Fold-
ing Box Co., 246 Pa. Super. 436, 371 A.2d 916 (1977) and Mellon v. Ritz, 332 Pa. 97, 2 A.2d
699 (1938) whose holdings are contrary, would appear to be wrongly decided. When there is a
written renewal agreement which does not contain a confession clause, the clause is not self-
sustaining and the signature on the renewal does not bear a direct relation to the confession of
judgment clause. The Tenreed and Mellon courts did not directly address this issue.
newal agreement. Although there are no cases considering that type
of renewal form and the correct decision is far from clear, such
agreements, at least under the broad language of the Frantz Tractor
case' 3 , would seem to be insufficient to allow a confession of judg-
ment during the extension term.
Finally, if the landlord confesses judgment against a holdover
tenant, it is to that tenant's advantage to argue that he remained on
the premises pursuant to an oral agreement with the landlord rather
than under the original lease. If the tenant can support his position
through deposition testimony, the confession would be invalid since a
confession clause cannot be renewed or extended by an oral
agreement. 3 6
5. Successive Entries.-Once a confession of judgment clause
is used by the landlord it is exhausted and may not be used a second
time, even if the language of the clause provides that it may be used
more than once.'3 7 The only exceptions to this principle are set forth
in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 2953(a) provides that when the
lease authorizes judgments to be confessed from time to time for
rental payments or other sums as or after they become due, succes-
sive actions may be commenced and judgments entered for such
sums. Additionally, Rule 2953(b), and its corollary, Rule 2972 pro-
vide that successive entries of judgment for money due under a lease
and for possession of the property are permitted if the lease autho-
rizes both types of confessions of judgment.
If a confession of judgment clause is used pursuant to a lease
and the lease subsequently is renewed by agreement of the parties,
the confession of judgment clause is not revitalized. It becomes sim-
ply the "renewal of an agreement of lease with the power of attorney
to enter judgment exhausted.' ' 8
Landlords often confess judgment against a tenant for acceler-
ated rent through the end of the term and thereafter settle when the
tenant agrees to bring all overdue charges current and to pay all rent
due in a timely manner. In that instance, if the landlord satisfies the
judgment after the settlement is reached, he has lost his main secur-
ity under the lease since judgment cannot be confessed again. The
landlord should therefore leave the judgment of record or, if the ten-
ant objects, have the tenant sign a new confession of judgment rider
135. See supra note 133.
136. Solazo v. Boyle, 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d 179 (1950). Cf. Cox v. Wilson, 201 Pa.
Super. 551, 193 A.2d 661 (1963).
137. General Neon Signs Outdoor Advertising Div. v. Steer Inn Sys., Inc., 46 Pa. D. &
C.2d 702 (1969). See, generally 8 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 2953 (1976). Contra Trans-Fuel,
Inc. v. Saylor, 440 Pa. 51, 269 A.2d 718 (1970).
138. Maricic v. Slesser, 44 Pa. D. & C. 693, 698 (1942). See also General Neon Signs
v. Steer Inn Sys., Inc., 46 Pa. D. & C. 2d 702 (1969).
to the lease. The landlord could use the new confession of judgment
clause if the tenant defaulted at any subsequent time during the
term of the lease.
IV. Distraint; Landlord's Lien; Execution
At one time, the landlord's right to distrain on personal property
located on the demised premises, and the landlord's resulting lien on
that property, was one of the most effective methods for securing
payment of overdue rent from a tenant. While recent federal and
state court decisions have substantially curtailed this remedy, they
have not totally abrogated this right of the landlord.
A. Distraint
1. Statutory Distraint. - Originally a common law remedy,
distraint is now a statutory remedy set forth in the Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1951, Sections 250.302 to 250.404. It is a method of
selling personal property on the demised premises to satisfy the ten-
ant's obligation for "any rent reserved and due."1 9 Basically, all
personal property located on the premises, whether or not owned by
the tenant, is subject to distress unless specifically exempted by
statute.140
The landlord accomplishes the distraint by levying on the per-
sonal property and giving notice of the levy within five days.141 The
statute does not specifically describe the manner of the levy. In most
cases, the landlord padlocks the premises and posts a notice of levy
on the door. However, while the landlord must assert some control
over the goods in order to accomplish distraint, that assumption of
control may be very slight and need only be a technical levy on the
property.42
The tenant has a right to replevy the goods within five days af-
ter notice of the distraint.43 If this is not done, the goods may be
appraised. 44 Thereafter the goods may be sold by a sheriff or con-
stable upon at least six days public notice. After deducting certain
prior claims, the proceeds are used to satisfy the rent for which the
property was distrained.1 45
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302 (Purdon 1984-85).
140. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dutton, 205 Pa. Super. 4, 6, 205 A.2d 656, 657
(1964).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 250.302 (Purdon 1984-85).
142. Stern's TRICKETT, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 194 (3d ed. 1971).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 250.306 (Purdon 1984-85).
144. Id. § 250.308.
145. Id.
2. Constitutional and Other Challenges to Distraint. - Be-
ginning with a series of decisions in the early 1970's, the federal
courts in Pennsylvania have maintained that the distraint procedures
of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 are unconstitutional. In
Gross v. Fox,"' the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found the Act's sections "unconstitutional on their face be-
cause they permit a landlord to levy on the property on a tenant's
premises without prior notice or hearing in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause."'11 Similarly, in Ragin v.
Schwartz,'" a three-judge District court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania found the Pennsylvania distraint statute constitution-
ally deficient with regard to residential leases.
Luria Brothers & Co., Inc. v. Allen 49 set forth the parameters
of constitutional analysis in distraint cases. In Luria, the landlord
personally posted a notice of distraint on the office door of subleased
premises and then padlocked the gates, refusing to allow the subten-
ant to remove approximately 300 tons of steel plate on the premises.
Thereafter, the subtenant posted a $90,000 bond and obtained re-
lease of his property. For that reason, the landlord never sold the
distrained goods in accordance with the procedures of the Landlord
and Tenant Act.
The subtenant subsequently sued the landlord in federal court,
alleging, inter alia, that the landlord's use of distraint was violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and therefore
gave rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, the Third
Circuit held that there was no cause of action because posting the
premises and padlocking the gates did not involve state action, a pre-
requisite to a constitutional cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment. The court held "that when a private person merely
takes advantage of a self-help remedy recognized by the state, his
actions are not attributable to the state. We therefore conclude that
no state action was presented by Economy's posting of the notice of
distraint . "... ,,50 The court also commented, however, that if, after
levy, the landlord proceeded to sell the distrained property through
the procedures of the statute, a constable or sheriff would necessarily
be used. 15 In that event, state action would clearly exist and the
distraint process would be unconstitutional under the prior federal
146. 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 496 F.2d 1153 (3d
Cir. 1974).
147. Id. at 1168.
148. 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
149. 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982).
150. 672 F.2d at 354.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.309 (Purdon 1984-85).
cases. 152
Luria Brothers is based on the federal constitution and does not
involve considerations of state statutory construction and state public
policy. As a result, under Luria Brothers a landlord could post a
distraint notice, padlock the premises and hold the tenant's property
indefinitely without raising a constitutional problem. However, since
the landlord could not sell the distrained property in accordance with
the distraint procedures of the Landlord and Tenant Act, he has no
means of realizing any proceeds. The most the landlord can do is
hold the tenant's property indefinitely, hoping to coerce the tenant
into paying the rent.
State law, however, may be more limiting. In McCumber v.
Arduini,1'5 a landlord distrained on a tenant's apartment by posting
a note on the door and changing the lock. Inside the apartment were
several rooms of furniture, personal belongings and clothes. Thereaf-
ter, the landlord took no steps to appraise or sell the distrained prop-
erty. When the case came to trial, the landlord had held tenant's
property for fifteen months.
The court first reviewed the various provisions of the distraint
section of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951. It then stated that
"while the statutory language uses the permissive "may" with regard
to the landlord's right of seeking appraisal and sale (sections 250.308
and 250.309 respectively), nothing in the act justifies an indefinite
seizure of a tenant's property without appraisal."' The court then
distinguished actual seizure of the tenant's property, as in the Mc-
Cumber case, from distraint accomplished by notice and a technical
levy which leaves the distrained property in the possession of the ten-
ant."5' The court decided that when property has actually been
seized, the landlord, as a matter of statutory construction, must pro-
ceed fairly quickly to sell the tenant's property in accordance with
the procedures of the distraint statute or violate that statute. How-
ever, since "the very sections which authorize action by either con-
stables or sheriffs are considered constitutionally infirm, . . . as a
practical effect, no physical seizure of a tenant's property is likely in
the future."' 56 The court therefore concluded "that the posting of
152. The Third Circuit said, "As the facts of this case demonstrate, one who posts a
notice of distraint need not involve state officials if he is content with posting the property and
does not proceed to sale." 672 F.2d at 354, n.14 (emphasis added).
153. 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 6 (1980).
154. 17 Pa. D. & C.3d at 12 (emphasis added).
155. This is the type of levy that a sheriff makes on personal property when enforcing a
writ of execution. PA. R. Civ. P. 3108(a). It is a rare case in which the sheriff takes manual
possession or custody of the tangible personal property upon which he has made a levy. Id.
3019(a). The property usually remains in the physical possession of the defendant and the
actual sale takes place at the defendant's property. Cf. id. 3127, 3128.
156. 17 Pa. D. & C.3d at 14.
the notice is the extent of the distraint that is authorized under the
act."
157
While the reasoning of the McCumber court is somewhat convo-
luted, the holding of the case is supported by the developing law in
the area of self-help repossession. As discussed in a later section of
this article,15 8 a landlord's self-help eviction of a tenant, i.e., an evic-
tion of the tenant without resort to legal process, is undoubtedly
against the public policy of Pennsylvania and is likely to be declared
unlawful when the issue next reaches the appellate courts. When a
landlord distrains on property and locks the premises, he will, in ef-
fect, have evicted his tenant by the use of self-help. Since self-help
eviction is unlawful without distraint, it is just as unlawful in con-
junction with a distraint. Therefore, the most that a landlord may do
to begin his distraint procedure is to levy on the property and give
the requisite notice, in accordance with the Act. A physical taking of
the property is unlawful.
Of course, these decisions severely limit the effectiveness of the
landlord's distraint remedy. As a result, the statutory landlord's lien
has also been severely limited.
B. Landlord's Lien
The landlord's lien in Pennsylvania is statutory159 and is inti-
mately related to the law of distraint. Like distraint, all goods upon
the demised premises, whether those of the tenant or a stranger are
subject to the landlord's lien unless specifically exempted by statute.
However, like a repairman's lien or a warehouseman's lien, the land-
lord's lien is possessory. The landlord "does not have a lien for rent
in the absence of distraint."1 60 As the court said in Shalet v. Klau-
der 1 ', "[The landlord's] right to distrain there is an inchoate, com-
mon-law right. 'It is rather in the nature of a lien, rather than a lien,
until the goods are actually distrained under a landlord's warrant





It is important to note that the landlord's lien may only be per-
fected by distraint on the property in the demised premises. If the
landlord obtains a judgment against his tenant and then has the
sheriff levy on the personal property, the landlord takes only as a
judgment creditor and not as a lien holder. "It is well settled that a
157. Id. at 13.
158. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 322 (Purdon 1984-85).
160. In re Uni-Lab, Inc., 282 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1960).
161. 34 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1929).
162. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
judgment creditor must look to the property of his debtor for the
satisfaction of his judgment and cannot sell the goods of others for
the satisfaction of it. This is part of the law of execution. 163
In Baltzell v. Peace " the landlord obtained a judgment for un-
paid rent and then issued execution on the judgment. At the time of
the sheriff's execution and levy, there was a refrigerator on the
premises under a bailment lease. If the landlord had distrained, the
refrigerator would have clearly been subject to the landlord's lien.
The court noted, however, that "the landlord chose not to distrain
but to enter judgment on the lease and issue execution. In such case,
under the authorities cited, the landlord may levy only the tenant's
goods and the refrigerator is not hers."'69
The landlord's lien attaches and is perfected as soon as the land-
lord levies on the property and gives the notice requisite under the
distraint statute. The landlord is not required to proceed to sale to
perfect his lien. In Kinney v. Russo,'66 the defendant landlord had
obtained a warrant of distraint and taken possession of the property.
The court held that this was enough to make the lien attach and the




The landlord's inchoate lien on property located on the demised
premises is a very powerful remedy if it can be legally perfected by
distraint. As stated before, unlike a general creditor (or even a se-
cured creditor) of the tenant, the landlord, by enforcing his lien is
able to sell property of persons other than his debtor-tenant in order
to satisfy his rent claim. In addition, the landlord's lien is superior to
a perfected Uniform Commercial Code security interest in personal
property located in the demised premises even if the landlord's dis-
traint (and perfection of his lien) takes place after the secured party
perfects his security interest in the chattels by filing financing state-
ments.16 8 This contrasts with the right of an ordinary judgment cred-
itor, who, upon an execution sale, apparently takes subject to a se-
curity interest in the chattels purchased. 6 9
163. National Cash Register Co. v. Sorto, 106 Pa. Super. 106, 109, 161 A. 766, 767
(1932).
164. 80 Pa. D. & C. 40 (1951).
165. Id. at 42-43. Accord Hallett I. Davis Piano Co. v. Fisher, 83 Pa. Super. 408
(1924); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Truby, 40 Pa. Super. 634 (1909).
166. 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 521 (1977).
167. Id. at 524.
168. In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1959). There are some
exceptions to this rule of general priority. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.403 (Purdon
1984-85).
169. Lantazy v. Velest Coal Co., Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 502 (1968); U.C.C. § 9-311
(1958).
C. The Limits of Distraint and the Landlord's Lien
To review the current state of the law, under the prevailing fed-
eral and state court appellate decisions on the issue of distraint, a
landlord may seize a tenant's property pursuant to a distraint and
hold that property indefinitely. He may not sell the property pursu-
ant to the distraint statute. Therefore, the sole purpose for seizing
the property would be to coerce the tenant into either paying his rent
or posting a replevin bond in order to obtain the release of his
property.
The next logical progression of the state court decisions'
would be to eliminate the landlord's right to seize the tenant's prop-
erty at all. The most the landlord will be able to do is make a techni-
cal levy and post the premises. This will be sufficient to perfect the
landlord's lien on the personal property located on the demised
premises and give that lien priority over any competing security in-
terest in that property.
At this point, the landlord must bring some kind of court action
in order to realize any gain from his assertion of a lien. One possibil-
ity is an action in replevin.17 Another is an assumpsit action against
the tenant for overdue rent. Once a money judgment is obtained in
that assumpsit action the sheriff may execute on that judgment, and
since the landlord's lien is already in place, the landlord may take as
a lien creditor instead of a judgment creditor. This is, however, an
open question not considered in any reported decision.
Even if these remedies are not very practical or do not have the
projected legal effect, the prior distraint may increase the landlord's
chances that there will still be property on the demised premises
when the sheriff arrives to levy on the assumpsit judgment. A tenant
who absconds with property after a distraint may be liable for treble
damages."' Also, a prior distraint will give the landlord substantial
leverage in dealing with a secured party. It may well be, however,
that for all practical purposes the landlord's distraint and landlord's
lien are dead remedies in Pennsylvania.'
170. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
171. A replevin action is one means of enforcing a security interest in personal prop-
erty. See Brandywine Lanes, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. Super. 363, 284 A.2d 802
(1971); U.C.C. § 9-503 (1958). A landlord's lien, perfected by a technical levy, would seem to
be analogous, especially since the landlord's lien is superior to the security interest. There do
not appear to be any cases on point.
172. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 250.311 (Purdon 1984-85).
173. To the extent distraint is not a dead remedy, the landlord must be careful to
strictly comply with the rules of distraint when attempting a distraint. In Luria Bros. & Co.,
Inc. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982) although the distraint as carried out was held to be
constitutional, the landlord was found liable for substantial damages because the distraint was
not proper under the Pennsylvania statute.
D. Landlord's Preference Upon Execution
By statute in Pennsylvania, a landlord has a preference in the
proceeds of an execution sale taking place on the demised premises
to the extent of one year's rent. 74 Since "it is not the actual distraint
which determines a landlord's preference, but the possibility of dis-
traint, 17 5 there can be no due process constitutional challenge to this
statute.
In order to collect his preference, the landlord must file his rent
claim prior to the time the sheriff distributes the proceeds of the
sale. 76 For the further protection of the landlord, a judgment credi-
tor may not stay an execution sale of a tenant's property without the
consent of the landlord.
77
The landlord's preference is superior to an execution and sale
brought pursuant to a perfected Uniform Commercial Code security
interest.7 8 In Herr & Co., Inc. v. Paar,179 the court recognized that
the plaintiff had perfected its security interest, but concluded that
"[i]n the face, however, of such clear statutory construction as has
been propounded above, the security interest must be subordinated
to this Commonwealth's policy of preferring a landlord."' 80
As stated before, the landlord's preference is for a maximum of
one year's rent. However, this one year maximum may include accel-




The landlord's lien, his preference in the proceeds of execution
and his right of distraint are all based on the outmoded notion that,
unlike a typical judgment creditor, a landlord has a special relation
to personal property located on the leased premises. This distinction
174. Pennsylvania law provides:
The goods or chattels being in or upon any ... tenements ... taken by virtue of
an execution, and liable to the distress of the landlord shall be liable for the
payment of any sums of money due for rent at the time of the taking of such
goods in execution: Provided, that such rent shall not exceed one year's rent.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 321 (Purdon 1984-85).
175. Herr & Co., Inc. v. Paar, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 581, 584 (1977).
176. While the case law is somewhat inconsistent on this point, see Stern's TRICKETT
ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 263 (3d ed. 1971), Pa. R. Civ. P. 3128 sets forth
the time limits for making claims to the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of personal property. The
sheriff's distribution will usually take place between 10 and 15 days after the sale.
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 325 (Purdon 1984-85), still in effect as part of the
common law of Pennsylvania.
178. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh v. Perkey, 4 Pa. D. & C.3d 581 (1977).
179. 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 581 (1977). The result would have been different if the secured
party had replevied the goods.
180. Id. at 585.
181. Platt, Barber & Co. v. Johnson, 168 Pa. 47, 31 A. 935 (1933).
182. Kramer v. Moore, 69 Pa. D. & C. 263 (1949).
makes little sense. Unlike a repairman or warehouseman, the land-
lord provides no special services for specific goods on the premises,
and therefore deserves no special rights over other creditors of the
tenant. Perhaps this is why the Bankruptcy Code no longer recog-
nizes the landlord's lien' 83 or gives the landlord any priority in the
proceeds of a bankrupt tenant's estate.
18 4
The best substitute remedy for the landlord in a commercial set-
ting is to draft a lease which grants the landlord a security interest
in the tenant's fixtures and inventory in the premises. To perfect this
security interest, the landlord would have to file two financing state-
ments signed by the tenant. 185 This landlord's lien, obtained pursu-
ant to the Uniform Commercial Code, would then be superior to
other creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy. 86
V. Actions for Eviction
A. Action For Possession Before A District Justice
1. Jurisdiction. - In theory, the fastest and most efficient
method of recovering the premises from a tenant is an action for
possession before a district justice. The Landlord and Tenant Act of
1951 expressly provides for jurisdiction before district justices.' 7
The actual proceedings before the district justice are now governed
by Chapter 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions
Before The District Justice.'
There is no jurisdictional limit on the type of lease that may be
subject to a district justice action. 189 Therefore, there is no legal rea-
son why a large commercial lease, requiring monthly payments of
many thousands of dollars, could not be the subject of an action for
possession before a district justice. 190 However, if the landlord com-
bines a claim for overdue rent with the claim for possession,"' the
183. II U.S.C. § 545 (1981).
184. Contrast 11 U.S.C. § 507, a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, with former 11
U.S.C. § 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, now repealed.
185. See generally Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1981).
187. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1515(a)(2) (Purdon 1984-85). Since most of the sec-
tions of the Landlord and Tenant Act dealing with actions for possession were repealed by the
Judicial Code, there is no longer any statutory authorization for this action to be brought
before the district justice. The statutory authorization may still survive as part of the common
law of Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 20003(b) (Purdon 1983-84). This anomaly
should be corrected by statutory amendment.
188. PA. R. Civ. P. D. J. 501-82.
189. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.502, repealed June 27, 1978. See supra note 182.
190. For a case apparently involving a large commercial lease brought before the dis-
trict justice, see 2401 Pennsylvania Avenue Corp. v. Southland Corp., 236 Pa. Super. 102, 344
A.2d 582 (1975).
191. PA. R. Civ. P. D. J. 503(c)(8). These rules set the procedure whereby a landlord
claim for overdue rent must be for $4,000 or less or the entire com-
plaint will be dismissed.19
2. Notice to Quit. - Before a landlord may bring an action
for possession before a district justice, he must serve a notice to quit
the premises on the tenant in accordance with Section 250.501 of the
Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951.193 The notice to quit, however,
may "be for a lesser time" than required by the statute "or may be
waived by the tenant if the lease so provides." 1 In practice, most
form leases provide for waiver of the notice to quit by the tenant.
In the event the lease is for an indeterminate term or a term less
than one year and the tenant is being evicted at the end of the term
or for breach of some covenant in the lease, the notice to quit shall
specify that the tenant must vacate the premises within thirty days
of service of the notice.1 95 If the lease is for a term of one year or
more, the notice period is ninety days.'9"
Regardless of the length of the lease term, if the tenant is being
evicted for failure to pay rent, the notice period is fifteen days from
the date of service if notice is given in the summer, i.e., between
April first and September first of any year. If notice is given in the
winter the notice period is increased to thirty days.
1 97
If notice to quit is given for the purpose of terminating the lease
at the end of the term, it may be served prior to the end of the term
but may not require the tenant to vacate before the term expires. For
example, to terminate a month-to-month tenancy, the landlord must
give the tenant a thirty-day notice to quit. No matter when the no-
tice is given, the termination must be effective as of the end of a
month. Any notice that requires the tenant to vacate prior to the end
of a month will be deemed effective as of the end of the month.
98
The notice to quit must be served in one of three ways: personal
service on the tenant, conspicuous posting on the demised premises
or delivery to the principal building on the premises. Service by reg-
istered or certified mail is ineffective.1 99
No particular form or words are necessary. However, the notice
may repossess premises if he has a right to evict the tenant. The substantive law, set forth at
Section (V)(B)(I) of this article controls as to when the landlord has a right to evict. Warren
v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 385, 115 A.2d, 218, 221(1955).
192. Ryder v. Prospect Park Realty Co., Inc., 206 Pa. Super. 108, 211 A.2d 53 (1965)
(decided when the jurisdictional amount was $500.00).





198. Mercer County Agricultural Soc'y v. Barnhardt, -- Pa. Super.__, 459 A.2d 811
(1983).
199. Dyarman v. Dyarman, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 651 (1956).
must "clearly and unequivocally notify the tenant to remove from
the premises" and specify the proper time period in which the tenant
must quit.2 00 If the record of the district justice does not indicate
compliance with the notice requirements of Section 250.501, or that
the required notice was waived by the tenant, any judgment for pos-
session entered by the district justice is defective.20 1 However, since
all complaints for possession before a district justice must now be on
a standard complaint form, the landlord's complaint, and therefore,
the district justice's record, will show that proper notice was given or
that notice was waived pursuant to the terms of the lease.202
3. Procedures Before the District Justice. - The action
before the district justice is commenced by filing a complaint on a
standard form prescribed by the State Court Administrator. 03 The
hearing is to be scheduled not less than seven nor more than twenty
days from the date the complaint is filed,2 ' although this time pe-
riod may be extended if the defendant files a counterclaim 205 or if a
continuance is granted.20 Service must be made by first class mail
or by a sheriff or constable at least five days prior to the hearing.20
Problems with service would obviously delay the date of the hearing
even further.
If the district justice rules in favor of the landlord, the judgment
for possession should be announced at the end of the hearing or
within five days thereafter by written notice. 08 The landlord must
then wait fifteen days before requesting an order for possession from
the district justice.2 0 9 The order for possession is then served by the
sheriff or a constable upon the defendant, giving him fifteen days to
vacate the demised premises voluntarily.2 10 If after fifteen days the
tenant remains on the premises, the executing officer may evict him
by force.21 However, at any time prior to actual eviction solely be-
cause of a failure to pay rent, the tenant may automatically stop the
eviction proceeding by paying the arrearage and the costs of the pro-
ceedings to the executing officer.212 Therefore, the time elapsed from
filing of the complaint to actual eviction could be as short as thirty-
200. Jankowski v. Orloske, 84 Pa. D. & C. 522, 524 (1952).
201. Patrycia Bros., Inc. v. McKeefrey, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 149 (1965).











seven days but will probably be closer to two months in the absence
of any appeal. Indeed, the minimum thirty day period from the date
of judgment for possession to the date of actual eviction is designed
to coincide with the tenant's thirty day appeal period to the Court of
Common Pleas."'.
The major problem with the summary action for possession
before the district justice is the tenant's unfettered right to appeal
for a trial de novo. 14 This right of appeal usually delays the actual
eviction of the tenant for many months. Consequently, the action
may no longer truthfully be categorized as "summary." It is surely
not a speedy judicial remedy.21 5
Unlike a judgment for money damages only, appeal from a
judgment for possession does not automatically act as a supersedeas.
In order to obtain the supersedeas, Pa. R. Civ. P. D. J. 1008(B)
requires that the tenant file a bond with the prothonotary, condi-
tioned for the payment of any judgment for rent and for damages
growing out of occupancy of or injury to the premises rendered
against the tenant on appeal. However, most tenants who are
brought before the district justice are residential tenants or small
commercial tenants who would likely be unable to obtain such a
bond and if that were the only method for obtaining a supersedeas
on appeal, the process would be constitutionally deficient.21 "
Rule 1008(B) also permits the various Courts of Common
Pleas, by local rule, to permit a tenant to pay monthly rental pay-
ments which come due during the pendency of his appeal into an
escrow account and thus obtain supersedeas. Significantly, this rule
only applies to payments that become due after the time the appeal
is filed. It does not provide for escrow of the rental payments deter-
mined to be due by the district justice prior to the date of the appeal.
The difficulties with Rule 1008(B) are obvious. The landlord ob-
tains no security for the amount of rent overdue for the months prior
to the tenant's appeal. Further, if the landlord is successful on ap-
peal, he will probably never collect rent for those months. On the
other hand, it would be unfair, if not constitutionally deficient, to
require a tenant (particularly a residential tenant) to initially post a
sum equal to four or five months' rent when the tenant may have a
complete defense to the landlord's action, such as a claim for breach
of the warranty of habitability.
Additionally, the payment into escrow provision is useless to the
213. Id. 515, note.
214. Id. 1002.
215. See infra notes 274-280 and accompanying text.
216. See e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Simmons v. West Haven Hous.
Auth., 399 U.S. 510 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Housing Auth. v. McKnight, 19
Pa. D. & C.3d 237 (1980).
landlord if the action for eviction was originally brought as a result
of the tenant's breach of a non-monetary provision in the lease. The
defendant-tenant may be damaging or destroying the demised prem-
ises or disturbing other tenants in the building while making timely
payments of monthly rent. Paying the monthly rent into escrow in
that situation will temporarily deprive a landlord of his monthly in-
come stream. Since many residential landlords rely on the monthly
rents to pay the mortgage and other expenses, a long break in the
income stream could cause irreparable harm to the landlord. It is
stereotyping of the worst kind to assume that all landlords are
wealthy and all tenants are poor.
While many of the Courts of Common Pleas have enacted local
rules pursuant to Rule 1008(B), the rules vary greatly in scope and
procedure. Courts which have not enacted a local rule may, by cus-
tom, allow the tenant to pay his monthly rental payments into court
pending appeal.21 7 It is clear, however, that changes must be made in
the procedures for appealing a district justice's judgment for posses-
sion so that the rights of all parties are adequately protected.
4. Some Suggestions. - The most effective changes in Rule
1008(B) and the various local rules enacted thereunder would ensure
that the summary action for possession would be a speedy judicial
remedy. Elimination of the tenant's absolute right of appeal to the
court of common pleas from a judgment of the district justice would
raise state constitutional problems.218 Therefore, it is the procedures
on appeal which must be modified.
First, Section 7361 of the Judicial Code 19 should be amended
to state that all appeals from judgments of a district justice must be
heard initially by a board of arbitrators appointed pursuant to the
compulsory arbitration statute.220 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1303, which governs the scheduling of arbitration hearings,
should be amended to require that all hearings be held, at the re-
quest of the landlord, within thirty days of filing of the appeal. To
facilitate prompt scheduling of the hearing, the rules of civil proce-
dure before the district justice should be amended to provide that
new pleadings need not be filed. Instead, the pleadings filed before
the district justice in the landlord's action for possession shall be ap-
plicable on appeal.
217. For example, Allegheny County, prior to enactment of its local rule in 1982, al-
lowed a tenant, by custom, to deposit monthly rental payments with the prothonotary and
thereby obtain a supersedeas.
218. Article 5, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[tihere shall be a
right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record ....
219. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361 (Purdon 1984-85).
220. This was accomplished in Allegheny County by local rule. See Allegheny County
Local Rule 1301(l)(d).
In the event the tenant takes an appeal from arbitration to
court, the hearing on appeal should also be held within thirty days of
filing. In this regard, Pa. R. Civ. P. 214, dealing with preferences on
the trial list, should be amended.
If the entire proceedings from filing of the complaint through
resolution of the matter on appeal can be handled in an expeditious
manner, the rights of both landlord and tenant can be protected. A
tenant who is really at fault will probably move voluntarily if he
knows that he cannot delay his day of reckoning forever. Similarly, a
tenant who is not at fault should be pleased to have his case adjudi-
cated in a timely manner.
B. Action In Ejectment
A second method for evicting a tenant is an action in ejectment
brought pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 1051-58. The amendment of Rule
1055 in 1979 enables the landlord to join a claim against the tenant
for rent or other damages which have arisen from the tenant's pos-
session of the demised premises in his complaint in ejectment. This
joinder of causes of action is identical to the procedure before the
district justice.221
1. Grounds For Terminating a Lease. - Obviously, an action
in ejectment is an appropriate means of evicting a tenant who has
remained on the premises after expiration of the lease. It is also an
appropriate remedy when the tenant breaches an important provision
in the lease and the landlord chooses to terminate the lease. Termi-
nation prior to the end of the term is often referred to as a "forfei-
ture of the lease."
Compelling public policy dictates that not every breach of the
lease results in forfeiture by the tenant:
Forfeiture is not a favorite of the law, and to permit a declara-
tion thereof for breach of covenant, the right thereto must be
distinctly reserved, the proof of the happening of the event upon
which it is to be exercised must be clear, the right must be exer-
cised promptly, and in equity the forfeiture must not be
unconscionable.
2 2
The phrase "in equity the forfeiture must not be unconscionable"
means simply that a lease may be forfeited only if the tenant's
breach is material and substantial.2 3 Similarly, Section 13.1 of the
Restatement (Second) of Property provides that the landlord may
221. PA. R. Civ. P. D. J. 503(c)(8).
222. Myers v. Ohio-Penn Gas & Oil Co., 294 Pa. 212, 220, 144 A. 93, 96 (1928).
223. "[O]ur Courts apply the equitable doctrine of substantial performance." Bar-
raclough v. Atlantic Refining Co., 230 Pa. Super. 276, 282, 326 A.2d 477, 480 (1974).
terminate the lease if the tenant fails to perform a valid promise
contained in the lease only if "as a consequence thereof, the landlord
is deprived of a significant inducement to the making of the lease."
The Pennsylvania courts have stated the rule in this manner:
Whether a breach is so substantial as to justify an injured
party's regarding the whole transaction as at an end is a ques-
tion of degree; and it must be answered by weighing the conse-
quences in the light of actual custom of men in the performance
of contracts similar to the one that is involved in the specific
case.22 4
The burden of proof is on the landlord to show that the tenant's
breach is so substantial as to justify forfeiture.225
Furthermore, technical or unintentional breaches of material
lease provisions will not support premature termination of the lease.
"When a party has honestly and faithfully performed all material
elements of its obligation under a contract, but has failed to fulfill
certain technical obligations, causing no serious detriment to the in-
jured party, it would be odious and inequitable to compel forfeiture
of the entire contract. ' 220 In Barraclough v. Atlantic Refining
Co.,227 the tenant accidentally made two monthly rental payments to
the bank holding the mortgage on the demised premises instead of to
the landlord after the mortgage had been satisfied. The court con-
cluded that the tenant's conduct did not justify eviction since he
promptly attempted to remedy his error, the breach was a minor
technical breach and the breach was caused, in part, by a strike of
the tenant's clerical staff.
Similarly, in Brown v. Brown22 8 the court refused to permit a
forfeiture of the lease where a tenant sent a check for the monthly
rent but inadvertently failed to sign it. On the other hand, a forfei-
ture for non-payment of rent will not be set aside when the tenant's
conduct is deliberate and in bad faith.
2 29
Nonpayment of rent is a breach of the lease which commonly
justifies forfeiture.2 3 0 The Restatement (Second) of Property is in ac-
cord "unless equitable considerations justify extending the time for
224. Easton Theatres, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Land & Mortgage Co., Inc., 265 Pa. Super.
334, 344, 401 A.2d 1333, 1338 (1979), dismissed as moot, 498 Pa. 557, 449 A.2d 1372
(1982).
225. Id. at 346, 401 A.2d at 1340.
226. Barraclough v. Atlantic Refining Co., 230 Pa. Super. 276, 282, 326 A.2d 477, 480
(1974).
227. Id.
228. 164 Pa. Super. 350, 64 A.2d 506 (1949).
229. See Blue Ridge Metal Mfg. Co. v. Proctor, 327 Pa. 424, 194 A. 559 (1937).
230. Rostan v. Chookagian, 69 Pa D. & C.2d 255 (1974); Craig v. Cosgrove, 277 Pa.
580, 121 A. 406 (1923).
payment." 31 Forfeiture has also been permitted when the tenant dis-
claims the landlord's title,2"2 breaches a provision against assignment
or subletting,33 breaches a provision against making alterations to
the demised premises, 34 breaches a provision against removing all
goods and chattels from the demised premises,235 or uses the prem-
ises for an illegal purpose.236
2. Notice of termination.-The notice to quit mandated by
Section 501 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951237 is only appli-
cable to summary actions for possession before the district justice.2 38
There is no statutory notice requirement precedent to an ejectment
action. Nor does the Restatement (Second) of Property require such
a notice, although it invariably requires a prior demand and a right
to cure before the tenant is in default.23 9 In Pennsylvania, however, a
provision in the lease that the lease shall be null and void upon the
tenant's failure to pay rent or keep other covenants "is not self-oper-
ating so as to make the lease void ipso facto by the default, but being
a provision for the benefit of the lessor may be enforced or waived at
his option. '2 40 Therefore, a notice of termination should be sent to
the tenant informing him that the landlord has exercised his right to
terminate the lease upon default. Since the notice is not mandated
by statute, the length of the notice period is unclear. While the no-
tice need not be in any particular form, it must be "clear, explicit
and unequivocal. 2 41
If the lease itself provides for a notice to quit with a specific
notice period, the terms of the lease must be followed. 2  Where a
lease prescribes a specific manner for declaring a forfeiture and
starting ejectment proceedings, the lessor must comply with those
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 (1977).
232. Jones v. Stuffier, 137 Pa. Super. 133, 8 A.2d 455 (1939); Institute of Protestant
Deaconesses v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493 (1929).
233. O'Brien v. Bunn, 5 Pa. D. & C. 552 (1924); Zeigler v. Lichten, 205 Pa. 104, 54 A.
489 (1903).
234. Goenner v. Glumicich, 81 Pa. Super. 521 (1923) (tenant took out partitions, win-
dows, and some weather bonding); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.2(2) (if the
tenant "makes changes in the physical condition of the leased property and the leased property
cannot be restored to its former condition" or if the tenant fails to restore it after prompt
request).
235. Waldman v. Baer, 81 Pa. Super. 390 (1923).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.5 (1977). Cf. Burke v. Bryant, 283
Pa. 114, 128 A. 821 (1925).
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.501 (Purdon 1984-85). See also supra notes 186-
191 and accompanying text.
238. McCafferty v. Davis, 74 Pa. Super. 172 (1920); Golden v. Willoughby, 66 Pa. D.
& C. 498 (1948). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 250.511 (Purdon 1984-85).
239. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Chapter 13 (1977).
240. English v. Yates, 205 Pa. 106, 108, 54 A. 503, 504 (1903).
241. Brown v. Brown, 164 Pa. Super. 350, 352, 64 A.2d 506, 507 (1949); Golden v.
Willoughby, 66 Pa. D. & C. 498 (1948).
242. Smucker v. Grinberg, 27 Pa. Super. 531 (1905).
terms.243
Elizabethtown Lodge No. 596, Loyal Order of Moose v. Ellis44
adds an additional requirement if the forfeiture is for nonpayment of
rent. The court held that unless a demand for rent is expressly
waived by the terms of the lease, a demand for rent by the landlord
is an essential prerequisite to a forfeiture for nonpayment. While the
decision in Elizabethtown was based on an inaccurate interpretation
of a prior line of cases, 2"1 the holding is in accord with the modern
rule as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Property. 246 There-
fore, a demand for rent, as contrasted with a notice of termination of
the lease,247 is a prerequisite to terminating the lease for nonpayment
of rent. 48
C. Confession of Judgment For Possession
If the lease contains a clause authorizing confession of judgment
for possession of the demised premises and the clause meets constitu-
tional standards, the landlord may immediately file a judgment for
possession against the tenant.2 49 To accomplish this, the landlord
must file a complaint.250 A praecipe may not be used. Almost simul-
taneously with the filing of the judgment the landlord may praecipe
for a writ of possession. 5' The sheriff will serve the writ of posses-
sion and evict the tenant shortly thereafter.
The principles of law applicable to actions in ejectment and con-
fessions of judgment for money generally apply to confessions of
judgment for possession of real property. Two additional topics are
important to a discussion of landlord's remedies.
1. Constitutional Problems.-As recently as 1974, the Penn-
sylvania courts have upheld the validity of lease clauses authorizing
confession of judgment for possession of the demised premises.2 ""
243. Girard Trust Co. v. Curry, 5 Pa. D. & C. 110 (1924).
244. 391 Pa. 19, 137 A.2d 286 (1958).
245. The cases held that where a lease does not provide a place at which the rent is
payable, the landlord must go upon the land and make a demand for rent on the precise day
due in order to work a forfeiture of the lease. See, e.g., McCormick v. Connell, 6 Serg. &
Rawle 151 (1820) and Stoeer v. Lessee of Whitman, 6 Binn. 419 (1814).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.1 (1977).
247. "A demand for payment and notice to quit cannot be equated for they are two
entirely different steps that a landlord must pursue before declaring forfeiture of a lease. The
purpose of the former is to afford the tenant a reasonable opportunity to make payment while
the purpose of the latter is to give the tenant time to prepare for eviction once he has failed to
respect the demand and further to evidence the fact that the landlord is exercising his option
to repossess the premises." Elizabethtown Lodge No. 596, Loyal Order of Moose v. Ellis, 391
Pa. 19, 27, 137 A.2d 286, 290 (1958).
248. See also Meyers v. Epstein, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 549, 563-64 (1965).
249. This procedure is authorized by PA. R. Civ. P. 2970-76.
250. Id. 2971.
251. Id. 3160, 3254 and 3255.
252. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. 596, 314 A.2d 333
The federal courts, however, have taken a more restrictive stance
with regard to residential leases.
In unreported orders entered in 1979 and 1980,253 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania en-
joined the Sheriff of Allegheny County from serving or executing
upon writs of possession obtained pursuant to a confessed judgment
in ejectment entered against a residential tenant. In an unreported
decision rendered in 1982, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania 2" enjoined the Sheriff of York
County from executing on a writ of possession based upon a con-
fessed judgment which arose from the specific residential lease of the
named plaintiff.
While it may take the Sheriff several weeks to conclude an exe-
cution based upon a confessed judgment for rent, an eviction based
upon a confessed judgment for possession may be completed within
three days of filing for the writ."5 A residential tenant may ther-
efore find himself, his family and his belongings on the street before
he ever has a chance to file a petition to open the judgment and raise
any defenses that he might have to the eviction. This clearly raises
due process problems. Therefore, the current trend will probably
continue and confessions of judgment for possession in residential
leases will eventually be declared invalid throughout Pennsylvania.
2. Assignment and Subletting.-As with confessions of judg-
ment for rent,2" confessions of judgment for possession may not be
filed against an assignee or subtenant who has not signed the
lease. 57 In order to evict a subtenant or assignee from the premises
the confession of judgment for possession should be filed against the
original tenant. Unless the subtenant officially intervenes in the pro-
ceedings, he has no right to attack the judgment by filing a petition
to strike and/or open the judgment ." The command of the writ of
possession entered on the judgment to the sheriff"' is broad enough
for the sheriff to evict anyone on the premises, including assignees
and subtenants. Therefore, because the subtenant is always subject
to the terms of the lease between his landlord and the owner the
subtenant can be ejected based upon the judgment for possession
against the original tenant. 60
(1973), affd in part, revd in part, 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
253. Lawson v. Coon, CA 79-292 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
254. Moye v. Nace, CA 81-1163 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
255. This is the practice in Allegheny County.
256. See supra notes 124-24 and accompanying text.
257. Kait v. Rose, 351 Pa. 560, 41 A.2d 750 (1945).
258. Craig v. Taylor, 160 Pa. Super. 101, 50 A.2d 118 (1946).
259. PA. R. Civ. P. 3255.
260. Stewart v. Lawson, 181 Pa. 549, 37 A. 518 (1897); Craig v. Taylor, 160 Pa.
VI. Self-Help Repossession
A. Self-Help Upon Abandonment By Tenant
It is well-established in Pennsylvania that when a tenant volun-
tarily abandons rented property, the landlord has the right to re-
enter the premises without the aid of legal process." 1 As the Su-
preme Court said in Turnway Corp. v. Soffer, "An abandonment of
the premises by the tenant is a relinquishment which, as a matter of
law, justifies immediate repossession by the landlord." 2  The Re-
statement (Second) of Property is in accord with this position. 2"
Thus, in Strawbridge & Clothier v. Stiffler,2  the Superior Court
held that when the tenant vacated the premises removing all prop-
erty except a piano and a stool, the landlord could enter the premises
with a passkey without first resorting to his legal remedies.
Landlords and tenants occasionally do not agree whether the
premises were abandoned when the landlord re-entered. The Penn-
sylvania courts have held that in order to prove abandonment of the
lease, the landlord must show: (1) an intention on the part of the
tenant to abandon and; (2) conduct by which the intention is carried
into effect.268 Although the burden of proof of abandonment is upon
the landlord, the burden can be met by circumstantial evidence. 2"
The Restatement (Second) of Property takes the position that if
the acts of the tenant are ambiguous the landlord must first ask the
tenant if he intends to abandon before taking action. Any conduct by
the tenant, however, "which creates a reasonable expectation in the
landlord, or incoming tenant, that the tenant does not intend to de-
prive him of free access to the premises may be regarded as an aban-
donment of the leased property."" 7
B. Self-Help Without Abandonment by Tenant
1. The Historic Rule.-In Overdeer v. Lewis,2 88 a case de-
cided before the Civil War, the Supreme Court held that a landlord
was not liable in trespass for dispossession of a holdover tenant
without first resorting to legal process so long as no unnecessary
force was used. In that case, the tenant brought a lawsuit against his
Super. 101, 50 A.2d 118 (1946).
261. Clarenbach v. Giordano, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 195, 198 (1978).
262. 461 Pa. 447, 459, 336 A.2d 871, 877 (1975).
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2, comment g (1977).
264. 100 Pa. Super 285 (1930).
265. Turnway, 461 Pa. at 460, 336 A.2d at 877.
266. Eckel v. Eiswerth, 371 Pa. 490, 92 A.2d 174, 177 (1952).
267. See supra note 248.
268. 1 Watts and Serg. 90 (Pa. 1841).
landlord for damage to property which the landlord had removed
from the demised premises in order to evict the tenant. The tenant,
who had been holding over after his lease had expired, had refused
to leave the premises immediately upon the landlord's demand but
offered to do so the next day. The Supreme Court stated that "[tihe
landlord might forcibly dispossess him on the instant, by night or by
day, and for motives of mere caprice; with this limitation, only that
he should use no greater force than might be necessary and do no
wanton damage."'"69
The few Pennsylvania cases in this area have not delineated the
boundaries of the term "unnecessary force." The Restatement pro-
vides that in jurisdictions in which self-help repossession is permit-
ted, repossession may only be accomplished "without causing physi-
cal harm, or the reasonable expectation of physical harm, to the
tenant, or any one else on the leased property with the permission of
the tenant."2 It further states that "there is no justification for the
use of self-help in a manner which may endanger persons or property
or provoke a breach of the peace.' ' av In Huggins v. Bridges,7
which is not strictly a landlord-tenant case, the Superior Court ex-
pressed its disapproval of conduct of an owner who sought to evict a
tenant by placing an obstruction upon the chimney, thus filling the
room with harmful gases. The court held that the tenant was entitled
to damages from the landlord even though the tenant had no right to
remain on the premises.
A landlord who uses self-help may remove furniture or other
property from the demised premises and place it in storage or else-
where at the owner's risk. 73 However, the landlord must use reason-
able care to avoid damage to the property of the tenant.
2 74
2. Reasons Advanced in Support of Self-Help Reposses-
sion.--Self-help remedies have long been approved by the Pennsyl-
vania legislature and courts. For example, Section 9-503 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code permits a creditor to repossess secured
chattels upon the debtor's default so long as no breach of the peace
occurs.27 5 Similarly, tort law has long recognized that a person has
the privilege to abate certain nuisances without resort to the
courts.2 6
The Mobile Home Park Rights Act specifically prohibits self-
269. Id. at 91.
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.3 (1977).
271. Id., comment a.
272. 29 Pa. Super. 82 (1905).
273. Mayer v. Chelten Avenue Bldg. Corp., 321 Pa. 193, 196, 183 A. 773, 774 (1936).
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.3 (1977).
275. 13 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9503 (Purdon 1984-85).
276. See 28 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Nuisance § 13 (1960).
help evictions of residents in Mobile Home parks . 77 Therefore, the
legislature has shown its ability to enact legislation which would
overrule existing case law which permits certain self-help remedies.
The Restatement (Second) of Property generally disapproves of
self-help repossession. Strangely, its analysis actually supports the
use of self-help in Pennsylvania. Section 14.2(1) provides:
[Ilf the controlling [statutory] law gives the landlord, or an in-
coming tenant, a speedy judicial remedy for the recovery of pos-
session of leased property from a tenant improperly holding over
after the termination of the lease, neither the landlord, nor the
incoming tenant, may resort to self-help to recover possession of
the leased property from such tenant, unless the controlling law
preserves the right of self-help.
78
The Restatement then explains what is meant by a speedy judicial
remedy:
A speedy judicial remedy is one which requires, on the part of a
party who would exercise it, only a short notice or demand, calls
for a prompt and summary determination of the issue of the
right to possession, and provides for swift execution of the judg-
ment. The judicial remedy available to the landlord, or incoming
tenant, must satisfy these criteria before there is a deprivation of
the right of self-help under the rule of this section. The judicial
remedy of ejectment normally is not a speedy judicial remedy.
27
In the previous section, the Restatement cites the summary action
for possession before the district justice as the speedy judicial rem-
edy in Pennsylvania.
As discussed above,280 an action for possession brought before
the district justice will often be a long and drawn out process. There
is a prior notice requirement of fifteen days to three months (unless
waived), a two month proceeding before the district justice, and an
absolute right of appeal to court which will delay the action
indefinitely.
Therefore, in Pennsylvania, the only speedy method for ob-
taining possession of premises from most recalcitrant tenants is self-
help. Accordingly, until substantial revisions are made to the action
for possession before a district justice self-help repossession is sup-
ported by the Restatement in Pennsylvania. Significantly, an appar-
ent majority of jurisdictions still permit the landlord to use some de-
277. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 398.3(b)(1) (Purdon 1984-85).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2(1) (1977).
279. Id. comment b.
280. See supra notes 186-219 and accompanying text.
gree of self-help to evict a holdover tenant from leased property.281
3. Reasons Advanced in Opposition to Self-Help Reposses-
sion.-A substantial and growing number of jurisdictions do not per-
mit self-help repossession.282 The most commonly advanced reason
for the elimination of a landlord's right to employ self-help measures
is the preservation of the public peace. The "orderly procedure and
preservation of the peace require that actual possession shall not be
disturbed except by legal process."'' 88 One court has commented that
"[i]t is difficult to imagine a more volatile situation from which ex-
treme violence could be reasonably anticipated than the surreptitious
removal of a man's home, whether it be a rented one or a mortgaged
one."' 84 Preservation of the peace may be paramount to facilitating
landlords' rights. Hence, this argument may outweigh all considera-
tions favoring self-help remedies.
The only reported Pennsylvania decision which prohibited the
use of self-help repossession appears to be Wofford v. Vavreck.'8 In
a well-reasoned opinion, the court first rejected the argument that
the passage of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 in and of itself
abolished the right of self-help repossession. However, the court then
held "that developing case law and public policy concerns preclude a
landlord in the 1980's from resorting to self-help to dispossess his
tenant."' 8
Although the court cited several reasons supporting its conclu-
sion, the court noted that "the use of self-help increases the potential
of violent confrontations between landlord and tenant"'8 7 and should
therefore be disapproved. This is in accord with the reasoning of the
courts in other states.
The court also held that the result was required by the Pugh v.
Holmes'" decision. Pugh v. Holmes was a major breakthrough in
tenant's rights in Pennsylvania. In that case the Supreme Court held
for the first time that all residential leases implied a warranty of
habitability. Further, the court held that if the landlord breaches the
implied warranty a tenant may be relieved of his duty to pay part or
all of his rent. Finally, the Supreme Court decided that there was no
absolute requirement that rent payments be deposited into escrow by
the tenant during his dispute with the landlord over the question of
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breach of the warranty of habitability issue 89
Wofford v. Vavreck held that Pugh almost mandates elimina-
tion of the right of self-help repossession of residential property.
Without its elimination, the right of a tenant to withhold rent upon
breach of the warranty of habitability would be meaningless. The
tenant could be out on the street before having an opportunity to
assert the warranty defense. The Wofford court stated:
[A] tenant, although relieved of his duty to pay rent because of
what he perceives to be a breach of the landlord's warranty of
habitability, becomes a sitting duck to a self-help eviction for
failure to pay his rent. In fact, the threat of a self-help eviction,
by making hollow the tenant's right to withhold rent, is the ulti-
mate weapon by which a landlord could effectively subvert his
obligation to deliver habitable premises.2 90
While this reasoning applies most obviously to residential leases,
the more general holding of Pugh v. Holmes was that all leases are
in the nature of contracts and are controlled by principles of contract
law.201 Thus, under general principles of contract law, all tenants,
even commercial tenants, may refuse to pay rent upon a material
breach of the lease by the landlord. Since a self-help eviction could
render this holding meaningless, it should be abolished with regard
to all types of leases. Thus, the reasons advanced in support of the
elimination of self-help repossession far outweigh those advanced in
favor of keeping the extra-judicial remedy.
Since the right of self-help eviction should be abolished, for the
reasons set forth above, any agreement in the lease granting that
right to the landlord "is against public policy and therefore void.1
29 2
Nearly all of the decisions from other states are in accord with this
rule. 93 One court has held that "[t]he fact that the lease by its
terms might sanction this type of activity by the landlord is of no
consequence, as the Court finds the above lease provision uncon-
scionable and unenforceable as a matter of law.29
VII. Conclusion
The abolition of self-help repossession, while consistent with the
ideals of a peaceful society, greatly prejudices a landlord's efforts to
regain possession of the demised premises. The absence of self-help
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relief coupled with the inefficient statutory eviction remedy effec-
tively strips a landlord of any remedy by which he can regain posses-
sion of the premises in summary fashion. Accordingly, the Landlord
Tenant Act of 1951 and the corresponding rules of procedure must
be amended. Unless the Act is amended, landlords will have received
nothing in exchange for the remedies which have been taken from
them by the courts and, therefore, the law will remain improperly
weighted against landlords.
As this article demonstrates, legal proceedings for eviction and
collection of overdue rent can be fashioned to provide a summary
legal process..29 The summary procedure can effect speedy reposses-
sion by a landlord and preserve a tenant's right to raise defenses to
the landlord's action. It is incumbent upon the legislature to enact
amendments to the Act to facilitate this proper balance between the
rights of landlords and tenants in Pennsylvania.
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